Corporate criminal liability in South Africa by Lewis, Lodea
i 
FACULTY OF LAW 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
LODEA LEWIS 
STUDENT NUMBER: 3520298 
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR RIEKIE WANDRAG 
A minithesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
MAGISTER LEGUM in the Department of Law at the University of the Western 
Cape. 
November 2019 
08 Fall 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 ii 
DECLARATION 
 
I declare that Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa is my own work and that it 
has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other university, 
and that all the sources I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged 
as complete references.  
 
Lodea Lewis       
Signed: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Dated:…………………… 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Riekie Wandrag  
Signed..........................  
Dated..........................  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 iii 
KEY WORDS: 
 
 
Corporate Criminal Liability 
Vicarious Liability 
Strict Liability 
Identification Doctrine  
Directing mind 
Derivative model or Aggregate model 
Organisational model 
Corporate Homicide 
Actus Rea 
Mens Rea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
I thank God Almighty for the gift of life and for giving me the opportunity to pursue 
my studies.  
I thank Professor Riekie Wandrag for supervising my work and for her I would also 
invaluable intellectual input, critical comments and advice throughout the writing of 
the research.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my Husband, Jeremy Lewis and my two little boys for 
their immeasurable love and support through what has been a challenging time to 
complete this research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 v 
 
Table of Contents 
Title Page……………………………………………………………………………...i 
Declaration……………………………………………………………………………ii 
Key Words…………………………………………………………………………...iii 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………..iv 
CHAPTER 1 .......................................................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 1 
RESEARCH PROBLEM ..................................................................................................................................... 1 
1. An Overview............................................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Problem Statement ................................................................................................................................. 4 
3. The Aim of the Research ....................................................................................................................... 6 
4. Research Question ................................................................................................................................... 6 
5. Chapter Outline ........................................................................................................................................ 7 
6. Research Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 2 ....................................................................................................................................................... 11 
THEORIES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY ............................................................ 11 
2.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 11 
2.1 Vicarious Liability – ........................................................................................................................... 13 
2.1.1 Limitations of Vicarious Liability................................................................................................. 19 
2.1.2 Criticisms of Vicarious Liability ................................................................................................... 23 
2.2 Identification Theory ........................................................................................................................ 24 
2.2.1 Criticism of Identification Theory ................................................................................................ 28 
2.3 Principle of Aggregation Theory .................................................................................................. 31 
2.3.1 Criticism of Aggregation Theory ................................................................................................. 34 
2.4 Organisational Model of Liability ................................................................................................ 35 
2.4.1 Criticism of Organisational model .............................................................................................. 40 
2.5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 41 
CHAPTER 3 ....................................................................................................................................................... 44 
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA ............................................................................................................................................................... 44 
3.1 Introduction: ........................................................................................................................................ 44 
3.2 Roman Law ........................................................................................................................................... 46 
3.3 Roman-Dutch Law ............................................................................................................................. 47 
3.4 The South African Common Law ................................................................................................. 47 
3.5 Development of Statutory law in South Africa ....................................................................... 50 
3.6 Current position on corporate criminal liability in South Africa ................................... 54 
3.6.1 Act ......................................................................................................................................................... 57 
3.6.2 Fault ..................................................................................................................................................... 58 
3.6.3 Intention ............................................................................................................................................. 59 
3.6.4 Negligence ......................................................................................................................................... 59 
3.6.5 Strict liability .................................................................................................................................... 61 
3.6.6 Express or implied instruction ................................................................................................. 66 
3.6.7 Furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation ................ 67 
3.6.8 Appearance at trial ............................................................................................................................. 68 
3.7 Common Law and Statutory Law Offences .............................................................................. 69 
3.7.1 Common Law Offences ..................................................................................................................... 69 
3.7.2 Statutory Law Offences ..................................................................................................................... 71 
3.7.3 Criminal liability of corporations, directors and servants under the Companies Act
 72 
3.7.4 Criminal liability of directors or servants within the corporation ................................. 73 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 vi 
3.7.5 Criminal liability of third persons / agents ......................................................................... 76 
3.8 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 81 
CHAPTER 4 ....................................................................................................................................................... 84 
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY ................................. 84 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 84 
4.2 Purpose of Punishment ................................................................................................................... 85 
4.3 Theories of Punishment .................................................................................................................. 86 
4.3.1 Absolute and Relative theories ..................................................................................................... 87 
4.3.1.2 Relative theories .............................................................................................................................. 89 
4.3.1.2.1 Preventative theory ................................................................................................................... 89 
4.3.2 Deterrence theory .............................................................................................................................. 91 
4.3.3 Reformative or Rehabilitation theory ...................................................................................... 94 
4.4 Punishment of corporate offenders............................................................................................ 95 
4.5 Sentencing the corporate offender ............................................................................................. 97 
4.5.1 Are financial sanctions deterrent enough .............................................................................. 98 
4.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 104 
CHAPTER 5 ..................................................................................................................................................... 105 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................ 105 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 105 
5.2 The way forward .............................................................................................................................. 108 
5.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................... 115 
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................................. 120 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
1. An Overview 
 
 
Criminal law defines certain standards of human behaviour as crimes,
1
 which is 
inherently linked to culpability and requires proof of an accused‟s mental state and is 
enforced through a system of state punishment.
2
 As a general rule, only human beings 
can perform an act, with the exception of a corporate body that can engage in conduct 
and be liable for a crime in certain circumstances.
3
 A corporation is a juristic person 
and the bearer of rights and duties similar to natural persons, however it lacks 
morality and a mind.
4
 Corporations have a separate legal persona to those who 
comprise it, however it acts and thinks through its members and this creates certain 
problems in attributing blame.
5
 
 
Corporations have been at the forefront of industrialisation and globalisation, which 
in turn drives an economy, however they can cause considerable harm to individuals 
and the environment,
6
 for example the Merriespruit tailings dam disaster of 1994
7
 and 
the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 that has been recorded as 
                                                        
1
 Burchell J Principles of Criminal Law 4 ed (2013) 3. 
2
 Pieth M & Ivory R Corporate Criminal Liability: Emergence, Convergence and Risk vol 9 (2011) 4. 
3
 Snyman CR Criminal Law 4 ed (2002) 249. 
4
 Pieth M & Ivory R (2011) 4. 
5
 Shkria E „Criminal Liability of Corporations: A Comparative Approach to Corporate Criminal 
Liability in Common Law and Civil Law Countries‟ (2013) 11 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290878 (accessed on 13 October 2015). 
6
 Pieth M & Ivory R (2011) 4. 
7
 Van Niekerk HJ & Viljoen MJ „Causes and consequences of the Merriespruit and other tailings-dam 
failures‟ (2005) 16 Land Degradation and Development 201-12. 
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the largest oil spill in history, which resulted in the death of eleven people and 
injuring seventeen others.
8
 The Deepwater Horizon spill serves as evidence of the 
magnitude of damage that corporations, especially larger corporations can cause, not 
only in relation to the impact that it has on individuals and the community, but on the 
environment as well and on this basis alone, corporations should be held accountable 
for their corporate and commercial criminal actions.
9
 
 
Corporate criminal liability is based on four models and includes: 
 the principle of vicarious liability (or respondeat superior) imputes the 
criminal liability of the unlawful conduct of the corporation‟s employees 
(director or servant) to the corporation itself;
10
 
 doctrine of identification (directing mind theory) attributes the conduct and 
the state of mind of high ranking officials to the corporation;
11
  
 aggregate or derivative model states that the corporation may be held 
criminally liable for the unlawful conduct of a group of individuals or 
representatives of company as opposed to only one individual;
12
 and  
 the organisational models of liability determines fault by examining 
institutional practices and corporate policies of the institution.
13
 
 
The United States of America (“US”) first adopted the principle of vicarious liability 
or respondeat superior in New York Central and Hudson River Railroad v United 
States
14
 whereby corporations are vicariously liable for all offences including those 
involving intent committed by employees acting within the scope of their 
employment
15
 and through the actions of the corporate directing mind and employees 
who act with intent to benefit the corporation.
16
 This principle was confirmed in 
                                                        
8
 Deepwater Horizon accident and response available at http://www.bp.com/en_us/bp-us/commitment-
to-the-gulf-of-mexico/deepwater-horizon-accident.html (accessed on 11 October 2015). 
9
 Snyman CR (2002) 249. 
10
 Burchell J (2013) 450. 
11
 Burchell J (2013) 450. 
12
 Jordaan L „New perspectives on the criminal liability of corporate bodies‟ in Burchell J & Erasmus 
A (ed) Criminal Justice in a New Society: Essays in honour of Solly Leeman (2003) 57. 
13
 Burchell J (2013) 450. 
14
 New York Central and Hudson River Railroad v United States 212 US 481 (1909) 
15
 Shkria E (2013) 9. 
16
 Keith N & Walsh G „International Corporate Liability‟ World Focus Vol 8 No 3 21. 
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Commonwealth v Angelo Todesca Corporation
17
 where the court held that a 
corporation could only act through its agents. Furthermore, US federal courts have 
also adopted the principle of aggregation to establish corporate criminal liability 
requiring intent as is evidenced in United States v Bank New England
18
 whereby the 
court acknowledged that the concept of collective knowledge pertaining to corporate 
criminal liability involves the compartmentalisation of knowledge which is 
partitioned to different departments of the bank and that the aggregate thereof 
comprises a corporation‟s knowledge of a specific operation.19 
 
The English courts have adopted both the principle of vicarious liability and the 
doctrine of identification
20
 to establish the criminal liability of a corporation. A 
corporation may either be held vicariously liable for strict liability offences in which 
the actus reus committed by an employee is imputed to the corporation irrespective of 
the employee‟s ranking within the corporation or whether the act amounts to a 
commission or omission
21
 as held in R v Gt North of England Railway Co
22
 and in 
Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council
23
 and where the mens rea of the 
agent committing the acts is imputed to the corporation was first held in Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited
24
 and later in Tesco 
Supermarkets v Natrass.
25
 
 
South African corporate criminal liability is developed from the common law and is 
based on the principle of vicarious liability where corporations are vested with legal 
personality and can be held criminally accountable for the wrongful acts of its 
employees (directors or servants) committed in the course and scope of employment 
or authority or while furthering the interests of the corporate body.
26
  
 
                                                        
17
 Commonwealth v Angelo Todesca Corporation 62 Mass. App. Ct. 599 (2004). 
18
 United States v Bank New England 821 F.2d 844 855 (1st Cir. 1987) 
19
 Jordaan L (2003) 58. 
20
 Shkria E (2013) 11. 
21
 Wells C Corporations and criminal responsibility 2 ed (2001) 89. 
22
 R v Gt North of England Railway Co (1846) 115 ER 1294, Ex 1846. 
23
 Tesco Stores Ltd v Brent London Borough Council (1993) 1 WLR 1037 (QBD). 
24
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited (1944) KB 
25
 Tesco Supermarkets v Natrass (1972) AC 153 (HL). 
26
 Farisani D „The regulation of corporate criminal liability in South Africa: A close look (Part 1)‟ 
(2006) 27 Obiter 269. 
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Corporate criminal liability in South Africa was first regulated by section 384 of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 (CPEA) which provided that in any 
criminal proceedings under statute or common law against the corporation, a director 
or servant may be charged with an offence and shall be punished for the offence 
unless he can prove that he was in no way a party thereto. The original section is 
based on the principle of vicarious liability, however, it differed with regards to the 
requirement that a director or servant was automatically deemed guilty unless he or 
she was able to prove that he was in no way a party to the commission of the crime.  
 
The current position is regulated in terms of section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 (CPA), whereby corporations may be held liable for the unlawful 
conduct and/or crimes committed by their employees in the course and scope of their 
employment or acting on authority whilst furthering the interests of the corporation.
27
 
It is important to note that section 332(1) of the CPA creates a broader liability 
compared to the traditional approach of vicarious liability in terms of which the 
unlawful act of an independent third party may also be imputed to the corporation if 
the evidence provides that the offence committed was on the express or implied 
instruction of a director or servant of the corporation in terms of section 332(1) of the 
CPA.
28
  
 
2. Problem Statement 
 
The possible interpretation of section 332(1) of the CPA is wide enough to include all 
types of common law and statutory law criminal offences including culpable 
homicide,
29
 theft,
30
 fraud,
31
 rape
32
 and negligence
33
 and it is thus not restricted to the 
                                                        
27
 Section 332(1) of the CPA. 
28
 Van Eerden H, Hopkins K & Adendorff C „Criminal liability of morally blameless corporations‟ 
(2011) DEREBUS 27. 
29
 R v Bennet & Co (Pty) Ltd (1941) TPD 194 and S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (Pvt) Ltd 1971 1 SA 33 
(RA). 
30
 R v Markins Motors (1959) SA 508 (A). 
31
 R v Wege 1959 (3) SA 268 (C). 
32
 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
33
 Jordaan L (2003) 51, Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie 
1992 (4) SA 804 (A). 
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commission of specific crimes, with the exception of crimes that can only be 
committed by natural persons such as bigamy, incest and perjury.
34
  
 
As stated above, corporate criminal liability is based on the principle of vicarious 
liability and some authors are of the opinion that this piece of legislation was poorly 
drafted in that it failed to specifically address the general principles of corporate 
criminal liability.
35
 This argument is further supported by numerous authors that 
questions whether this provision is sufficient and agree that this piece of legislation is 
not satisfactory in that it fails to serve as an adequate and effective means to curb 
corporate crime and are further of the opinion that this provision should either be 
amended or supplemented with appropriate legislation.
36
 
 
This research therefore aims to examine the need to regulate corporate criminal 
liability and whether the organisational model is the correct model for establishing 
corporate criminal liability and further, whether the current legislation based on the 
principle of vicarious liability sufficiently and satisfactorily addresses the commission 
of all criminal actions of corporations and whether the current financial sanctions 
serve as an effective deterrent for would be corporate transgressors of corporate crime.  
 
Certain authors are of the opinion that the imposition of financial sanctions may be 
detrimental to innocent stakeholders.
37
 This study intends to provide arguments for 
and against the imposition of punitive financial sanctions whilst considering the 
negative and possibly harmful effects that these sanctions may have on the innocent 
stakeholder. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
34
 Burchell J (2013) 456. 
35
 Nana CN „Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: The need to look beyond Vicarious liability‟ 
(2011) Journal of African Law 55 89. 
36
 Farisani D „Corporate Criminal Liability for Deaths, Injuries and Illnesses: Is South Africa‟s Mining 
Sector Ready for a Change?‟ (2012) 26 Speculum Juris 2. 
37
 Burchell J (2013) 459. 
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3. The Aim of the Research 
 
In this thesis, a detailed analysis of the provisions of section 332(1) of the CPA 
pertaining to the regulation of corporate criminal liability will be made including a 
critical analysis of sections 384 of the CPEA as well as the applicable sections of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act”) with further reference to the principle 
of vicarious liability whilst relying on the writings and comments of various authors. 
In order to examine the need to regulate corporate criminal liability, reference needs 
to be made to the position under the common law and the applicable statutory 
legislation with comparisons to the provisions of foreign legislations dealing with 
similar issues. Due regard will be taken in respect of the models and legislation 
pertaining to corporate criminal liability used in the United Kingdom and United 
States of America as these are of particular importance especially in relation to the 
principle of vicarious liability and the doctrine of identification including the 
implementation of the legislation dealing with culpable homicide and ensuring 
effective punishment of corporate crime. Reference to Canada and Australia will also 
be made in the text where necessary. 
 
4. Research Question  
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the provisions of section 332(1) of the CPA in 
order to establish whether it effectively regulates corporate criminal liability; the 
effectiveness of which will be measured with reference to available case law and 
journal articles pertaining to the successful prosecution and punishment of 
corporations.  
 
The objectives of the research are as follows: 
 Evaluate the need to regulate criminal liability of corporations. 
 Evaluate the different models of corporate criminal liability and determine 
whether the organisational model (corporate culture) is the most appropriate 
model for South Africa with reference to those used in Australia and the US 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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and make recommendations as to why the model should be improved or 
changed. 
 Critically analyse and examine the need to punish corporations for corporate 
crime, keeping in mind that corporate prosecution and liability should not 
detract from individual liability. 
 Examine whether section 332(1) of the CPA effectively deters would be 
transgressors from committing crime and whether the financial sanctions 
imposed on corporations serve as an effective deterrent thereto; the 
effectiveness of which will be measured and tested against the successful 
prosecution and the imposition of financial sanctions against corporations 
found guilty of corporate crime and/or how its effectiveness can be improved. 
 
 
5. Chapter Outline 
 
This thesis will consist of five chapters. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter serves as an introduction to this study. It also provides the research 
problem, aims of the research, the issues that are to be examined, the literature review, 
the research methodology and the chapter outline. 
 
Chapter 2: Theories of Corporate Criminal Responsibility 
 
This chapter aims to discuss the development and origin of corporate criminal law and 
includes a detailed discussion and analysis of the different theories on corporate 
criminal responsibility which includes; vicarious liability (respondeat superior), 
identification theory, aggregation theory and organisational models of corporate 
liability that determines fault by examining the institutional practices and corporate 
policies of the institution. This discussion will include a comparative interpretation 
and analysis of the respective models used and applied in the United States of 
America, United Kingdom and South Africa in particular.  
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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Chapter 3: The origin and development of Corporate Criminal Liability of 
Corporations in South Africa 
 
This chapter will discuss the origins and development of corporate criminal liability 
with reference to the common law (vicarious liability), Roman law, Roman Dutch 
Law and statutory law.  
 
This chapter will discuss the current position pertaining to the criminality of corporate 
liability with reference to statutory and common law offences and applicable case law 
and include a critical evaluation of the provisions of section 332(1) of the CPA with 
reference to strict liability, negligence, intent, fault and supporting case law and 
arguments from academic writers. 
 
Corporate criminal liability in South Africa is derived from the common law and is 
based on an extended principle of vicarious liability, which was first embodied in 
section 384 of the CPEA, which was later repealed and replaced with section 332(1) 
of the CPA. This chapter will provide a comparative summary of sections 384 of the 
CPEA and 332(1) CPA, respectively. 
 
This chapter will highlight the notable differences between vicarious liability and 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa and make recommendations to improve 
the current model and legislation with reference to the other derivative models and 
those models used in United States of America and the United Kingdom and where 
the text requires, reference will be made to Canada and Australia. 
 
Chapter 4: The theories of punishment and corporate criminal liability 
 
This chapter will contain a detailed and analytical discussion of the theories of 
punishment and corporate criminal liability including deterrence, retribution, 
rehabilitation and prevention. It will contain an evaluation as to whether it is indeed 
appropriate to punish corporations for transgressions against individuals and the 
community as a whole and whether the financial sanctions imposed are an effective 
deterrent against the commission of corporate crime. The chapter will include 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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comparisons to the enforcement of the punishment imposed in other countries for 
corporations found guilty of corporate crime.  
 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
This chapter will contain concluding remarks based on the research obtained in this 
study as well as recommendations. 
 
6. Research Methodology 
 
For the purpose of this thesis an interpretational and comparative method of research 
will be adopted with particular reference to the models and legislation applied in the 
US, UK, Canada and Australia in order to understand and describe the concept of 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa with reference to the principle of vicarious 
liability and the relevant provisions under the CPEA, CPA and the Companies Act 71 
of 2008. South African corporate liability is founded on the principle of vicarious 
liability, which is similar to the models applied in the US and the UK. Furthermore, 
the Canadian corporate model adopts a form of strict liability which is similar to 
section 332(5) of the CPA whereby an employee is presumed to be guilty unless he 
can prove that he did not partake in the commission of the crime and that he used due 
diligence to avoid the commission thereof.
38
 Furthermore, South African corporate 
criminal law stands to gain immensely from the models and legislation that are used 
and applied in the US, UK, Canada and Australia. 
 
In order to provide depth to this thesis, the research methodology will consist of an 
analysis of the following documentary evidence in order to identify and address the 
shortcomings of the aggregate or derivative model to corporate criminal liability with 
specific reference to section 332(1) of the CPA and employ comparative studies 
between South African corporate criminal law and those of selected countries that 
                                                        
38
 This section was declared unconstitutional in S v Coetzee & Others 1997 (3) SA 527 (CC). 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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may have more effective regulatory frameworks in place, to learn from their 
experiences and for purposes of possible application in South Africa: 
 
 Primary sources: 
 Case law 
 South African legislation 
 Foreign legislation 
 Foreign case law  
 
 
 Secondary sources: 
 Journal articles 
 Books 
 Empirical data with reference to newspaper articles  
 Internet sources  
 
In order to ensure the authenticity of the research is maintained, adherence to the 
statutory rules of interpretation will be observed, emphasis will be placed on primary 
sources as far as possible including South African and foreign legislation as well as 
relevant case law and commentaries by recognised authors in the field taking into 
account its evidentiary weighting. Furthermore, the research will present opposing 
viewpoints of academic commentators on which the concluding remarks will be based. 
 
Opinions submitted in numerous articles from various legal writers will be considered. 
Therefore, no interviews will be conducted. All the data collected for the purpose of 
this dissertation is in the public domain. For this reason, no ethical considerations will 
arise.  
 
 
 
 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORIES OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the provisions of section 332(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) which is based on the principle of 
vicarious liability, effectively regulates corporate criminal liability in South Africa. 
The discussion contained herein is the first step in answering the research question of 
whether the principle of vicarious liability sufficiently and satisfactorily addresses the 
criminal acts of corporations and whether the current financial sanctions serve as an 
effective deterrent for would be corporate transgressors guilty of corporate crime.   
 
In this chapter, the author will examine the three derivative models of attribution, 
which include the principle of vicarious liability, identification doctrine and the 
aggregation theory and present criticisms on each theory of corporate criminal 
liability. The derivative models underpin corporate criminal liability whereby the fault 
of one or more persons are imputed to a corporate body as its own known as the rule 
of attribution. The author will discuss the organisational model of fault, which 
recognises true corporate fault by examining whether this model is best suited to 
establish corporate criminal liability. Corporate fault is determined in accordance with 
a corporate body‟s failure to implement effective policy considerations and/or 
examines a corporation‟s corporate culture that creates an environment that 
encourages criminal behaviour. The author will present arguments as to why the 
organisational model is best suited to regulated corporate criminal liability in South 
Africa.  
 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
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This discussion will include a comparative interpretation and analysis of the 
respective models used and applied in the United States of America, United Kingdom 
and South Africa in particular.  
 
The law in general refers to natural and juristic persons, both of whom are capable of 
being the bearer of rights and obligations. Criminal law provides for the punishment 
of individuals who commit unlawful actions.
39
 It is trite law that only natural persons 
can be held responsible for criminal offences, as human beings alone possess a 
blameworthy state of mind and the physical and mental capacity to perform unlawful 
acts.
40
 Corporations are juristic persons that are afforded the same rights and duties as 
natural persons and as such, criminal law applies equally to corporations as it does 
natural persons. Corporations have a separate legal persona to those who comprise it, 
however corporations act and think through its members and this has proved 
problematic in attributing blame.
41
 
 
The attribution of criminal liability in respect of corporations poses a problem in that 
criminal law is based upon the attribution of moral fault and a blameworthy state of 
mind.
42
 This begs the question, what constitutes a legal entity or an enterprise?
43
 
Corporations may be defined as an enterprise or a legal entity that comprises of a 
body of persons whether natural or juristic, which has commercial profit or a common 
objective as its goal
44
 and includes companies, universities and building societies and 
common law legal persons such as non-governmental organisations and clubs.
45
  
 
A corporation as a legal entity is an artificial being, enacted in terms of enabling 
legislation and it is distinct and separate from all of the individuals who comprise it.
46
  
Corporate bodies are capable of acquiring rights and duties and as such, they may sue 
                                                        
39
 Snyman CR (2002) 5. 
40
 Farisani D „The regulation of corporate criminal liability in South Africa: A close look (Part 1)‟ 27 
(2006) Obiter 264. 
41
 Shkira E „Criminal Liability of Corporations: A Comparative Approach to Corporate Criminal 
Liability in Common Law and Civil Law Countries‟ (2013) 11 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2290878 
(accessed on 13 October 2015). 
42
 Wells C „Containing corporate crime: civil or criminal controls?‟ in Gobert J & Pascal AM (eds) 
European Developments in Corporate Criminal Liability (2011) 20. 
43
 Foster N „The theoretical background: the nature of the actors in corporate social responsibility‟ in 
Tully S (ed) Research Handbook on Corporate Legal Responsibility (2005) 3. 
44
 Foster N (2005) 5. 
45
 Snyman CR (2002) 5. 
46
 Foster N (2005) 7-9. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 13 
and be sued and incur criminal liability in their own names and on their own 
account.
47
 Corporate criminal liability is an exception to the rule that only natural 
persons can be held responsible for criminal offences. Juristic persons such as 
companies may also be held criminally liable for the commission of certain statutory 
and common law offences committed in its name and on its behalf through its agents, 
despite its inability to think and act for itself.
48
 There has been constant debate 
whether the notion of corporate criminal liability is practical considering that a 
corporation is fictitious in nature and unable to formulate its own intention, to think 
and act for itself, instead all of these acts are carried out by employees or agents 
acting on its behalf.
49
 Moreover, the concept of blameworthiness presupposes 
personal responsibility, something that a corporation lacks as it does not have a 
physical existence. 
 
There are four main theories underpinning corporate criminal liability: 
i) Vicarious Liability 
ii) Identification Theory 
iii) Principle of Aggregation 
iv) Organisational model of Liability  
 
2.1 Vicarious Liability –  
 
The principle of vicarious liability was established in the earliest of legal systems 
whereby a group or association of persons could be held liable for the wrongful acts 
of one of their members even though they lacked the necessary culpability in respect 
of the commission of the crime.
50
 Vicarious liability is based on the master/servant 
relationship that was developed in order to protect innocent third parties and 
employees from the unlawful actions of an employee, whereby the employer is held 
                                                        
47Wells C „Corporate Criminal Responsibility‟ in Tully S (ed) Research Handbook on Corporate Legal 
Responsibility (2005) 147. 
48
 Farisani D (2006) 264. 
49
 Snyman CR (2002) 249. 
50
 Snyman CR (2002) 247. 
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responsible for the actions of its employee.
51
 In civilised legal systems, the concept of 
vicarious liability has always been rejected in criminal law, as no person should be 
held responsible for the crimes of another unless they had participated in the 
commission thereof.
52
  
 
Under South African law, a person may be found guilty of the commission of a crime 
irrespective of whether that person had participated in the commission of the said 
crime, in other words, a person may be vicariously liable for the actions of another.
53
 
 
It is important to note that the principle of vicarious liability is only applicable under 
statute and that in terms of the South African common law no person can be held 
liable for the commission of a crime of which he did not commit, nor was a 
participant thereto nor authorised the commission thereof.
54
 
 
The principle of vicarious liability is not limited to the unlawful acts of natural 
persons. A corporation may in terms of the CPA be held liable for any criminal acts 
committed in its name by that of a director, member, employee acting in the course 
and scope of their employment or an agent acting on instructions of or in the process 
of furthering or attempting to further the interests of the said corporation, despite its 
inability to think or act on its own.
55
 Therefore all legal acts committed on behalf of a 
corporate body by a director, employee or agent is vicarious in nature.
56
 
 
                                                        
51
 Nana CN „Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: The need to look beyond Vicarious liability‟ 
Journal of African Law 55 (2011) 93. 
52
 Colvin E „Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability‟ 6 (1995) Criminal Law Forum 6 available at 
https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.uwc.ac.za/content/pdf/10.1007%2FBF01095717.pdf  (accessed on 
17 October 2017). 
53
 Snyman CR (2002) 247. 
54
 Burchell J (2013) 439, Section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
The South African law of Delict recognises liability without fault and is referred to as vicarious 
liability, which has been borrowed from the English law (common law) and may also be defined in 
general terms as the strict liability of one person for the delict of another. The law of Delict refers to 
the relationship between two persons and includes; the employer-employee, principal-agent and 
motorcar owner-motorcar driver. The employer‟s liability is determined in accordance whether the 
employee had acted within the course and scope of his employment or had acted ultra vires (here the 
court has must apply the so-called standard test set in Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) 
(see Neethling J, Potgieter JM, Visser PJ Law of Delict 5ed (2006) 338 and fn 32 below. 
55
 Section 332(1) of the CPA, Farisani D „The regulation of corporate criminal liability in South Africa: 
A close look (Part 1)‟ (2006) 27 Obiter 265. 
56
 Smith JC and Hogan B Criminal Law 7ed (1992) 178 cited by Colvin E (1995). 
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Vicarious liability may be defined as the strict liability of one person for the unlawful 
and prohibited acts of another.
57
 Under the common law, an employer or principal is 
vicariously liable for the delictual actions committed by an employee or agent, 
irrespective of the absence of fault on part of employer, provided that the act was 
committed in the course and scope of the employment, and that the act is the fault of 
the employee or the agent.
58
 Vicarious liability has been previously enforced by the 
legislature whether expressly or by implication.
59
 In R v Wunderlich
60
 the court stated 
that the holder of a liquor licence may be held responsible for the wrongful acts 
committed by a barman who had contravened the provisions of the then Liquor Act 
27 of 1989.
61
  
 
South African corporate criminal law and in particular, section 332 of the CPA states 
that all offenders are liable, which means that the director or servant or agent of the 
said corporation will not be able to escape liability for their criminal actions.
62
 The 
legislature enacted a wide interpretation of the concept of vicarious liability to ensure 
that employers could not escape liability by hiding behind the actions and omissions 
of their employees.
63
 The CPA imposes vicarious liability either expressly and/or 
impliedly on a corporate body or employer for acts committed within the course and 
scope of employment or authority of its employees or agents.
64
 Moreover, in terms of 
the CPA, a corporation may be held liable for acts that fall outside such scope, 
provided that the act was committed in furtherance of or an attempt to further interests 
of the said corporation.
65
 The court stated that an employee acts within the scope of 
his/her employment when he was “about the affairs, or business, or doing the work” 
of the employer in ABSA Bank Ltd v Born Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd.
66
 
Moreover, a corporation can only be vicariously liable if the prosecution is able to 
                                                        
57
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58
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65
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prove to the court that the director or servant was a director or servant of the said 
corporation and was acting in capacity as such at the time when the crime was 
committed.
67
 
 
In K v Minister of Safety and Security,
68
 it was held that the policemen were in breach 
of their duty to serve and protect as they had violated their authority provided to them 
by the Minister when they raped K.
69
 The underlying question before the court was 
whether the criminal acts of the policemen fell within the course and scope of their 
employment. It was argued that the criminal conduct of the policemen did not fall 
within the course and scope of their employment and that their actions amounted to a 
deviation from their employment. The Constitutional Court referred to the decision in 
Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall
70
 and stated that in order to determine whether an employer 
is responsible for a deviation from authorised duties resulting in the criminal conduct, 
the court must look at the nature and the extent of the deviation before the employer 
can be held liable.
71
 The Constitutional Court held that in order to determine whether 
or not the conduct falls within or outside the scope of their employment, the so-called 
standard test applied in Minister of Police v Rabie
72
 must be applied. The 
Constitutional Court held further that there must be a „sufficiently close link between 
the three policeman‟s acts for their own personal interests and the business of their 
employer‟ which included the fact they were policeman dressed in their police 
uniforms, had offered a lift to the victim who had subsequently placed her trust in the 
police officers by virtue of them being police officers and who had violated her trust 
                                                        
67
 ABSA Bank Ltd v Born Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA) 378, Nana CN 
(2011) 94. 
68
 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
69
 Burchell J (2013) 444. 
70
 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733. 
71
 Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733, An intentional deviation from employment or authority 
cannot absolve an employer from being found liable for the criminal conduct of an employee, provided 
that the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment and that it would be 
reasonably possible to link the act of the employee to the business of the employer. 
72
 Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) at para 134C-E the court held “It seems clear that an 
act done by a servant solemnly for his own interest and purposes, although occasioned by his 
employment, may fall outside the course or scope of his employment. This is a subjective test. On the 
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business of his employer, the employer would be liable. This is the objective test. In conflating the two 
tests to the facts, he found the employer liable. Moreover, “... a master...is liable even for acts which he 
has not authorized provided that they are so connected with acts which he has authorized that they may 
rightly be regarded as modes – although improper modes – of doing them”.  
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when they had raped her.
73
 The court held that the policeman were acting under the 
authority of the state and despite deviating from their duties by offering the victim a 
lift home, were still found to be acting within the course and scope of their 
employment and as such the Minister was found to be vicariously liable for the 
actions of the police officers.
74
 In this regard, Burchell‟s assertion that employment is 
as much about the disregard of one‟s responsibilities as that of fulfilment of one‟s 
duty is correct.
75
  
 
Heidi Barnes, an advocate of the High Court of South Africa refers to the 
Constitutional Court decision in F v Minister of Safety and Security
76
 as a: 
 
“ground-breaking judgement in two important respects: firstly, it finally does 
away with the fiction that an employee acts within the course and scope of her 
employment in the so-called deviation cases in the law of vicarious liability 
and secondly it clarifies the normative basis for holding the state vicariously 
liable for the criminal acts of police officers”.77 
 
Moreover, the importance of this judgement lies in the fact that it encourages state 
accountability for the unlawful and criminal actions of police officers.
78
 The court 
awarded damages to the Plaintiff on the basis that the Minister was vicariously liable 
for the actions of the police officer as there was a sufficiently close connection 
between his criminal conduct and his employment as a police officer.
79
 The 
sufficiently-close connect test applied in the latter was first laid down by the court in 
K v Minister of Safety and Security 
80
 whereby the court stated that it is possible for an 
                                                        
73
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employee to simultaneously act within and outside the course and scope of his 
employment.
81
   
 
The principle of vicarious liability is applicable in section 24(1) of the Drugs and 
Trafficking Act whereby the unlawful actions of an employee may be imputed to an 
employer and deemed as the unlawful acts of the employer unless the employer is 
able to prove that it was not aware, nor did it authorise or partake in the unlawful 
commission of the alleged act and that such act does not fall within the course and 
scope of the employee‟s employment.82  
 
In the US, the courts have adopted the principle of vicarious liability or respondeat 
superior whereby corporations are held vicariously liable for all offences committed 
by employees acting within the scope of their employment
83
 and through the actions 
of the corporate directing mind and employees who act with the intent to benefit the 
corporation.
84
 This principle was confirmed in Commonwealth v Angelo Todesca 
Corporation
85
 where the court held that a corporation could only act through its 
agents. Corporations may be held criminally liable for any conduct performed by any 
representative or employee authorised to act on its behalf and for its benefit.
86
 
 
Moreover, corporate bodies are held criminally liable for the actions of any of its 
agents or employees, irrespective of their standing, provided that the act was 
committed within the scope of their employment and with the intention to benefit the 
corporation. This was confirmed in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v 
United States (New York Central)
 87
 where the assistant traffic manager was found 
guilty of bribery in respect of providing certain railroad users with discounted 
shipping rates on railroad rates that were far below the stipulated rate and that these 
actions were further in contravention of the Elkins Act 19 of 1903 and thus subject to 
                                                        
81
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criminal sanctions.
88
 The US Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the court a 
quo and confirmed further that the actions of the assistant traffic manager who gave 
discounts on railroad rates constitutes bribery.
89
  
 
Apart from the identification theory as described below, English courts have adopted 
the principle of vicarious liability by attributing corporate blame to a corporation in 
respect of strict liability offences in which the actus reus committed by an employee 
is imputed to the corporation irrespective of the employee‟s ranking within the 
corporation or whether the act amounts to a commission or omission.
90
 
 
The author submits that vicarious liability does not reflect true corporate decision-
making and that despite its obvious limitations, the rule of attributions makes it 
difficult for corporations to escape liability for the criminal acts of its employees, 
directors or servants. Unlike the identification theory, the application of vicarious 
liability is not limited to the acts of the controlling mind and senior managers of the 
corporation who through delegation of duties to mid level managers and employees 
may evade liability on the basis that such persons cannot be easily identified.
91
  
 
2.1.1 Limitations of Vicarious Liability  
 
Holding an employer liable for the negligent acts of another is an established principle 
in South African law. Vicarious liability stems from the master servant relationship 
where the employer is liable for the offences of its employees, this is a form of strict 
liability. An employer may also be found liable for offences requiring proof of mens 
rea or negligence, known as the principle of delegation.
92
 The general rule in this 
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regard is that an employer cannot be guilty of offence unless it is proved that he was 
aware of what was going on or was negligent.
93
 
 
Allen argues that there are three limitations to the application of vicarious liability, a 
discussion of which will be provided below:
94
 
 
2.1.1.1 First Limitation 
 
Firstly, vicarious liability arises when the employee commits an act within the course 
and scope of his employment or as a third party acting under the authority of the 
accused.
95
  
 
In Adams v Camfoni,
96
 the license holder was found not guilty and discharged for 
supplying alcohol outside the permitted hours as the messenger had lacked the 
necessary authority to conclude the sale and subsequently, the license holder was 
acquitted of the charge.
97
  
 
Under South African law, an employer may be held vicariously responsible for the 
unlawful acts of its employees committed during the course and scope of its 
employment.
98
 The judgement delivered by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Minister 
of Defence v Von Benecke
99
 extends the scope of the employer‟s vicarious liability to 
include the criminal acts of its employees regardless of whether the act was 
committed in the course and scope of his/her employment.
100
 The standard test is 
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95
 Allen M (2013) 267. 
96
 Adams v Camfoni 1929 1 KB 95. 
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 Minister of Defence v Von Benecke
99
 (115/12) (2012) ZASCA 158. 
100
 Minister of Defence v Von Benecke
100
 (115/12) (2012) ZASCA 158 at para 14 and 26, the court held 
that an employer can be liable despite absence of causal connection between conduct and course and 
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1986 (1) SA 117 (A)). 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 21 
applied in determining the vicarious liability of the employer as held in Rabie.
101
 
However, the Gauteng High Court chose not to follow the standard test and instead 
adopted the approach applied by the court in NK v Minister of Safety and Security,
102
 
whereby the court stated that the test should be aligned in accordance with the Bill of 
Rights that reflects the spirit, purpose and objects of the Constitution.
103
 The 
motivation for such extension lies in the reasoning that the standard test could not 
provide the complainant with a just remedy.
104
  
 
2.1.1.2 Second Limitation 
 
The second limitation applies in the instance where an employer may be vicariously 
liable under statute, for example the Licensing Act 1964.
105
 
 
In Ferguson v Weaving,
106
 the court held that the licensee holder could not be held 
vicariously liable for an employee‟s act that amounts to the aiding and abetting of an 
offence, if she had no knowledge thereof.
107
 Under the Licensing Act 1921, a licensee 
holder could not be held liable for an offence where she was unaware that an offence 
had been committed and as such, the waiters‟ knowledge could not be imputed to the 
licensee holder and was subsequently found to be not guilty of the offence.
108
  
 
Under South African law, an employer may be liable for the actions of its employees 
under statute as was held in R v Wunderlich.
109
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2.1.1.3 Third Limitation 
 
The third limitation applies in the instance whereby an employer may be found 
vicariously liable when an employee attempts to commit an offence.  
 
In Gardner v Akeroyd,
110
 the court stated that vicarious liability could not be 
attributed to an employer where an employee attempts to commit an offence „even 
though vicarious liability could have been imposed on the employer for the completed 
offence‟.111  
 
As stated above, an employer may be vicariously liable for the unlawful actions of its 
employees committed within and outside the course and scope of his or her 
employment.
112
 Moreover, vicariously liability of the employer extends to the 
employee‟s deviation where the unlawful act is not in furtherance of his or her 
duties.
113
 The author submits that an employer may be vicariously liable for the 
actions of an employee who attempts to commit an offence, provided that the court 
applies the test laid down by the Constitutional Court in K v Minister of Safety of 
Security.
114
 The test requires two questions to be asked; namely: 
 Were the wrongful acts done solely for purposes of the employee? 
 If the acts were for the employee‟s own purposes, is there a sufficiently close 
link between the employee‟s acts and the purposes of the and the business of 
the employer to give rise to vicarious liability? 
The first question is subjective.  The second question is objective.  Even if the first 
question is answered in the affirmative, the employer may still be held liable if the 
second question is answered in the affirmative.
115
 
 
 
                                                        
110
 Gardner v Akeroyd (1952) 2 QB 743. 
111
 Allen M (2013) 268. 
112
 See fn 59-62. 
113
 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC), see fn 29-30. 
114
 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC). 
115
 Botha MM and Millard D (2012) 232-3. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 23 
2.1.2 Criticisms of Vicarious Liability  
 
Vicarious liability has often been described as simultaneously being too narrow and 
too broad.
116
 Mays suggest that despite criticisms levied against it, the need to extend 
the meaning of vicarious liability beyond the regulatory sphere is that it may remain 
useful in respect of serious statutory offences.
117
 
 
Colvin asserts that it is under-inclusive as vicarious corporate criminal liability is only 
committed through the unlawful act of a natural person, regardless of whether the 
corporation commits the unlawful act, the courts are more concerned with individual 
fault as opposed to corporate fault.
118
 The same concept underpins vicarious liability 
in South Africa whereby corporations are held liable despite the absence of fault.
119
 
 
Vicarious liability is also over-inclusive as it holds the corporation liable irrespective 
of the presence of mens rea on part of the corporate body and whether or not it was 
aware of any criminal acts or could have prevented the commission thereof.
120
 It has 
been argued that vicarious liability could be „ruinous to businesses‟ as this model 
holds the corporation liable for the acts of all employees, irrespective of their rank.
121
 
Therefore, it has been suggested that corporate criminal liability should not extend 
further than the crimes committed by senior management and the controlling minds of 
the corporation.
122
 
 
The application of strict liability and the pre-eminence of fault infringes on an 
individual‟s constitutional right to not be deprived of their freedom and security; and 
of presumption of innocence as set out in sections 12 and 35 of the 1996 Constitution, 
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respectively.
123
 Under South African law, juristic persons are entrenched with the 
same rights as natural persons.
124
 Vicarious liability treats juristic persons differently 
because the fault enquiry is not required whereas with natural persons, it is.
125
 
Imposing vicarious liability on corporate bodies may be unfair as it stigmatises a 
corporation when it is charged with a criminal offence.
126
 Furthermore, innocent 
shareholders are punished and the reputations of companies are damaged.  
 
Many writers reject the concept of vicarious liability as it holds another liable despite 
the prerequisite of fault.
127
 Moreover, the application of vicarious liability may 
infringe upon the corporate body‟s fundamental rights to be presumed innocent and 
the right to a fair trial, held under sections 35(3)(h) and 35(3) of the 1996 Constitution, 
respectively. The author submits that the application of vicarious liability may not be 
the most suitable model in holding corporate bodies liable, as it is both over and under 
inclusive. Moreover, the South African legislature should instead adopt a model that 
incorporates corporate fault, this will be discussed in section 2.4 below. 
 
2.2 Identification Theory  
 
English courts have adopted two theories in its approach to control and regulate 
corporate criminal liability in the UK.
128
 English courts have applied the agency 
theory also known as vicarious liability
129
 and the identification doctrine.
130
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English courts may hold corporate bodies vicariously liable for statutory offences 
committed in the regulatory sphere pertaining to the commission or omission of 
crimes that do not require mens rea or those offences requiring mens rea where there 
has been non – compliance with the statute.131  
 
However, English courts were not convinced that imputing the fault of every servant 
or employee of the corporate body to the corporate body was the way forward and 
instead made a distinction between the corporation‟s policy makers and those who 
implemented the policies, in other words the minds and the hands of the 
corporation.
132
 This approach was first introduced in 1915 in respect of a civil matter 
in Lennard’s Carrying CO Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum CO Ltd133 by Viscount Haldane 
LC of the House of Lords and it later gained prominence in corporate criminal law 
where the doctrine of identification was first introduced in the matter of Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd.
134
  
 
Moreover, the actions of senior management are considered to be the actions of the 
corporation and attributing the fault or blameworthiness of these senior officers to the 
corporate body, provided the mental element (mens rea) that is necessary to secure a 
conviction for the commission of the crime.
135
 This approach was explained in HL 
Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd
136
 by comparing a corporate 
body to that of a human body that together with its intellectual capacity and central 
nervous system not only controls what it does but also directs the corporate mind as to 
how to act.
137
 Furthermore, it is argued that those who implement the policies and 
procedures cannot be said to the mind of the company as they are merely acting on 
the authority and instructions of those who have created the policies and instruct 
others to perform or carry out functions are considered to be the directing mind of the 
company.
138
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In light hereof, English courts predominantly follows the identification theory in 
respect of non-regulatory offences.
139
  
 
The identification theory is also known as the „directing mind‟ or „alter ego‟ theory 
and stems from English law that imputes the criminal actions of senior corporate 
officials who are for the purposes of this theory referred to as the alter ego of the 
corporation directly to the corporation
140
 pertaining to the commission of serious 
crimes such as „fraud, theft and manslaughter,‟ 141  „furthering or endeavouring to 
further the interests of the corporation.‟142 According to the identification doctrine, the 
corporate body is directly responsible for the unlawful acts of its employees or 
officers as their acts and omissions are considered to be those of the corporate body 
itself.
143
 Moreover, in terms of the alter ego theory, the conduct and state of mind of 
certain high-ranking officials are attributed to the corporate body as its own
144
 as held 
in Director of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd
145
 where the 
court referred to the conduct and the state of mind of certain senior ranking officials 
in the corporation as the conduct and state of mind of the corporation itself.
146
 The 
successful application of the doctrine depends firstly on identifying the person(s) 
responsible within the corporate body and secondly, the person responsible for the 
unlawful act must be the directing mind and will of the corporation before criminal 
liability can be attributed to the corporation.
147
 
 
The doctrine was approved in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattras
148
 where the court 
ruled that a corporate body may be found criminally liable for the wrongful actions of 
the representatives of the company such as the members of the board of directors and 
senior management who directs the will of and carries out the functions of the 
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company and those who could be easily identified within the company.
149
 The court 
ruled further that the branch manager was acting on the instructions from and 
controlled by the board of directors and therefore could not be regarded as the 
directing mind of the company.
150
 The court stated further that only the unlawful and 
wrongful actions of the senior ranking official who is at fault could be attributed to 
the corporate body, as the mind of the senior ranking official is the mind of the 
company.
151
 
 
The US and Canadian courts have to a certain extent adopted the principles of the 
identification theory.
152
 The Canadian corporate criminal approach incorporates the 
identification theory as adopted in the United Kingdom
153
 and further expanded upon 
the Tesco principle
154
 whereby corporations may be held liable for the commission or 
omission of any acts performed on its behalf by a director, officer or employee 
involved in the creation and execution of the company‟s policy, irrespective of the 
ranking of the individual at fault.
155
 In other words, liability of the corporation is not 
limited to the identity or the position of the person responsible.  
 
In Dredge and Duck CO v The Queen (Canadian Dredge),
156
 the Canadian court held 
that a corporation could not present as a defense that the directing mind had targeted 
the company or that the company did not derive any benefit from the conduct of the 
directing mind and laid down three requirements for the application of the 
identification doctrine: 
 “(a) the act must be within the field of operation assigned to the directing mind; 
(b) the act must not be totally in fraud of the corporation; and  
(c) the company must have benefited from the act”.157 
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In Dredge & Dock Co v R
158
 the Supreme Court of Canada extended the scope of the 
identification theory by acknowledging that a corporation may depending on its 
particular structure possibly have more than one directing mind, whereby transport 
companies for example, must out of necessity operate by the delegation and sub-
delegation of authority from the corporate centre.
159
  
 
Similarities pertaining to the identification doctrine may be found in the US Model 
Penal Code whereby corporations may be held liable for the actions of its board of 
directors or any high managerial agent acting on its behalf. Nevertheless, the principle 
of vicarious liability or respondeat superior is applied in the US to determine 
corporate criminal liability in respect of regulatory offenses.
160
 
 
2.2.1 Criticism of Identification Theory 
 
It has been suggested that the doctrine is flawed in that it fails to address the problem 
of corporate wrongdoing whereby the wrongful actions of senior officials can only be 
attributed to the company where the person can be identified, failure to identify the 
individual will result in the company evading criminal liability
161
 as was held in Tesco 
Supermarkets Ltd v Nattras.
162
 Furthermore, the problem with the doctrine lies in the 
fact that it tries to assert human attributes or characteristics onto the corporate body in 
respect of fault.
163
 
 
It may be argued that the attribution of liability in application of this doctrine is 
haphazardly applied as it depends entirely on the actions of the corporate employees 
without considering the existence of corporate fault and a company may still be 
charged with an offence and be held accountable despite the implementation of 
practical safeguards.
164
 The implementation of safeguards was raised as a defense in 
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Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie (SABC)
165
 
which suggests that the liability imposed is similar to that of vicarious liability 
whereby the corporation may be able to escape liability if it is able to prove on a 
balance of probabilities that the said officer had acted with the requisite „due 
diligence‟.166 Jordaan asserts that the decision handed down by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal may also be raised as a defense to vicarious corporate criminal liability under 
Section 332(1) of the CPA.
167
 
 
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass
168
 the court ruled that only members of the 
board of directors and senior management who are a part of the corporate hierarchy 
could be easily identified within the company.
169
 Some authors argue that the Tesco 
principle is unsatisfactory in that it fails to determine culpability of the corporate body 
as fault is usually attributed to the representative of the company, instead of the 
company itself and application of the principle in larger companies makes it near 
impossible to ascertain the identity of the senior official responsible for the offence as 
opposed to the determination of fault in smaller companies.
170
 It has also been argued 
that application of the doctrine is quite narrow in its approach and this was 
encapsulated in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattras
171
 where the court ruled that only 
senior individuals with the requisite authority could be identified within the 
company.
172
 Application of this doctrine resulted in the failure of the state in securing 
a conviction for manslaughter for the loss of nearly two hundred lives in R v P & 
European Ferries (Dover) Ltd
173
 where the defendant company was charged with 
manslaughter subsequent to the Zeebrugge sinking, it was impossible to identify who 
the master of the ship was and as such, the company evaded liability.
174
 
 
In R v Redfern and Dunlop Ltd (Aircraft Division),
175
 the court deemed the position of 
                                                        
165
 Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie 1992 (4) SA 804 (A) 
807. 
166
 Wells C Corporations and criminal responsibility 2 ed (2001) 132. 
167
 Jordaan L (2003) 56. 
168
 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (1972) AC 153 (HL). 
169
 Jordaan L (2003) 55 and Burchell J (2013) 451. 
170
 Wells C (2005) 152. 
171
 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass (1972) AC 153 (HL). 
172
 Jordaan L (2003) 55. 
173
 R v P & European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (1991) 93 CR App 73. 
174
 Jordaan L (2003) 55. 
175
 R v Redfern and Dunlop Ltd (Aircraft Division) (1993) Crim L R 43. 
https://etd.uwc.ac.za
 30 
European Sales Manager of the Dunlop aviation company, who despite being aware 
of the sale of weaponry to Iran which was in contravention of agreed sanctions, as 
immaterial as he was not considered to be a senior ranking official and thus his 
conduct and intentions could not be equated to that of the mind of the company and as 
such, the company evaded conviction.
176
 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the identification doctrine is a modified version 
of vicarious liability whereby the liability of a limited class of employees are imputed 
to the corporation and this poses certain problems for the court in terms of identifying 
who the actual „brain‟ of the corporation is and the restriction of the doctrine has 
created problems in securing corporate convictions in the United Kingdom.
177
 This is 
especially so as in reality a corporate body may have more than one controlling 
mind
178
 as was confirmed by the Canadian Supreme Court in Dredge & Dock Co v 
R.
179
 
 
This approach is narrowly interpreted and fails to consider the essence of modern-day 
corporate decision making in larger companies pertaining to the implementation of 
corporate policies and procedures of the company as a whole as opposed to those of a 
„single individual at top level‟.180  In Dredge and Duck CO v The Queen (Canadian 
Dredge)
181
 it was held that application of the doctrine was either „too broad or too 
narrow or too simplistic‟.182 The Canadian court criticised the doctrine for being too 
narrow in its approach in that corporate liability is limited to the actions or omissions 
of senior officials or managers who has the power and authority to make and 
implement decisions on behalf of the corporation when in practice, it may often be 
found that it is quite difficult to establish who the actual corporate decision makers 
are.
183
  
 
In light of the above, it may be argued that the application of the principle of vicarious 
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liability in attributing corporate blame is probably more suitable in holding corporate 
bodies liable as the unlawful actions of its employees are imputed to the corporation 
irrespective of the individual at fault‟s seniority. The identification theory does not 
apply to South African corporate criminal law. 
 
2.3 Principle of Aggregation Theory  
 
Under the aggregation model, corporate criminal liability is determined in accordance 
with the conduct and state of mind and culpability of the individuals concerned 
together with the corporation.
184
 Aggregation may be classified as a move towards 
corporate criminal liability that is organisational as opposed to individual liability.
185
 
 
Mays states that this model is an “extension of the identification model whereby the 
criminal mind is identified in the collectivity of corporate personnel”. 186  The 
aggregated and collective acts of the corporation as a whole is used to ascertain 
corporate criminal liability 
187
 as opposed to the wrongful actions of only one of its 
senior ranking officials.
188
  
 
The United States refers to the aggregation theory as the collective knowledge 
doctrine.
189
 The doctrine was applied in the US federal courts in the matter of United 
States v Bank of New England
190
 to establish corporate criminal liability. The question 
before the court was whether a corporation together with the individuals concerned 
could be found guilty and subsequently convicted of a particular crime.
191
 
Furthermore, a corporation could not evade liability on the basis that it is impossible 
to identify those individuals guilty of any wrongful actions as was noted in 
application of the identification theory.  
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Application of the aggregation theory applies only in instances where negligence is an 
element of the offense and not in offences requiring intent as it equates to a fictional 
attribution of fault.  Under the American model, the aggregation theory provides that 
a corporation may be held liable for the acts of one employee and for the conduct of 
another, which together equates to the actus reus and mens rea of a crime.
192
 This 
approach was adopted in the United States v Bank of New England
193
 where the court 
applied the aggregate theory in order to convict the bank of a crime requiring 
intent.
194
 The court found that the bank may be held liable for an offence if it can be 
shown that it had the necessary knowledge regardless of whether such knowledge was 
known by any one of its employees.
195
 Moreover, the bank‟s knowledge equates to 
the knowledge of all of its employees as all corporations compartmentalise knowledge 
by subdividing its responsibilities into smaller components.
196
 Therefore, it is “the 
aggregate of those components which constitute the corporations knowledge of a 
particular operation”.197  
 
In the UK, however, it appears that the courts are more inclined to accept negligence 
as a form of corporate liability in determining collective fault of the corporation in the 
exercise of reasonable care in the decision making process.
198
 As noted above, a 
company may escape criminally liability when the senior ranking official responsible 
for the commission of the crime cannot be ascertained or identified within the 
company.
199
 This was the case in R v P & 0 European Ferries (Dover) Ltd
200
 where 
the corporation was charged and subsequently acquitted of manslaughter in respect of 
a boat that had capsized, taking the lives of nearly two hundred people on the basis 
that the prosecution was unable to secure a conviction as it could not ascertain the 
identity of the person responsible nor attribute fault for the commission of the crime 
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thereto.
201
 It has been suggested that the principle of aggregation pertaining to fault 
could have possibly secured a conviction of the company by showing that senior 
management had failed to adopt and implement safety measures by ensuring the 
installation of warning indicator lights that would inform the bridge whether the doors 
were open or closed and ascertaining the identity of the ship master would have been 
irrelevant in securing a conviction.
202
 Nevertheless application of this principle has 
not fared favourably in the UK.
203
 In the English case of R. v H.M. Coroner for East 
Kent,
204
 the court held that personal liability of one person in a matter cannot be 
transferred to another person.
205
  
 
Under the Canadian approach, the Model Criminal Code makes provision for the 
aggregation of negligence of the conduct of any senior officer (director), employee or 
official of the corporation.
206
 Canada adopted a collective responsibility approach 
with which to discern corporate criminal liability. Under this approach, a corporation 
may be found guilty even if no director, employee or official committed the full 
elements of the offence, instead the effect of the negligent conduct of two or more 
agents are viewed cumulatively.
207
  
 
Under the Australian model, the Criminal Code (Act 1995) makes provision for the 
aggregation of negligence where no one person is at fault, however corporate fault 
may be deduced by aggregating the actions of its employees, agents or officers.
208
 
Negligence may be established through ineffectual and mismanagement of the 
conduct of one or more its employees or the failure to implement effective 
communication platforms within the corporation.
209
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2.3.1 Criticism of Aggregation Theory 
 
Wells argues that while application of the aggregation theory may seem appealing, it 
poses certain difficulties as success of the principle relies on the aggregated unlawful 
actions and knowledge of individuals that are attributed to the corporation.
210
  
 
It has also been suggested corporate criminal liability cannot be rightly ascertained 
where fault exists in someone other than the actual person that committed the 
unlawful action.
211
  
 
Mays provides a logical argument pertaining to the issues of aggregation such as 
whose knowledge within the corporation should be aggregated? Should the courts 
employ the methodology of the identification doctrine as used in the Tesco 
Supermarkets Ltd v Nattras
212
 whereby the knowledge of the senior executives are 
„aggregated to form the required mens rea?‟ Wells argues that reliance on the 
aggregation of knowledge creates a fiction that the corporate body is aware of the 
actions of its employees and suggests that the aggregation doctrine is defective and 
not the solution in determining corporate criminal liability.
213
 
 
Colvin argues that aggregation „distorts‟ the essence of corporate criminal liability. 
Moreover, the aggregation theory is derivative as it is based in part on vicarious 
liability and identification theory whereby the knowledge of an agent is equated with 
the owner of the conduct and as such, aggregation does not address true corporate 
decision – making.214 Cavanagh‟s assertion further supports the argument that the 
principle of aggregation does not reflect true corporate reality as the focus remains on 
attributing human fault to the corporate body.
215
 Wilkinson states further that the 
derivate models do not „adequately measure‟ the liability of the corporate body and 
that corporate liability should „look further than the individuals‟ that comprise it by 
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adopting an approach that examines a corporation‟s policies and procedures.216 
 
The principle of aggregation does not find application in South Africa. Certain 
authors are of the opinion that the legislature should upon reformation of section 
332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 consider including the aggregation 
theory „as it recognises the nature of the complex organisational structures of 
today‟.217 There are many disadvantages to this theory as discussed herein above.  
Application of this theory has not found much favour in countries such as the 
UK and as such, the author does not think that this model is best suited in 
determining the criminal liability of corporations in South Africa.
218
 
 
2.4 Organisational Model of Liability  
 
Wells refers to this model as the systems theory whereby fault is attributed to the 
corporation through its internal decision-making structures and policies.
219
 Gobert 
asserts that a corporate body is a „distinct organic entity whose mind is embodied in 
the policies it has adopted‟ and that when a corporate body‟s policies or ethos creates 
an environment to commit an offence, then the company should be held liable in its 
own right and not derivatively‟.220 
 
Mays asserts that: 
“The theory of corporate fault is one essentially based on collective fault. The 
company as a whole has liability not by the actions or intentions of individuals 
within but rather through expressions of the collective will of the company. 
The most obvious place for such expressions of intent to be found is in 
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company policies and procedures”.221  
 
The Law Commission in England and Wales introduced the organisational model in 
the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (Act 2007), which 
makes provision for the offence of statutory manslaughter.
222
 Act 2007 provides that a 
corporation commits such an offence whereby management failure is the sole reason 
or one of the reasons that resulted in the death of a person or where such failure 
amounts to a gross breach of the expected reasonable standard of care expected of a 
corporation.
223
 The organisational model was created in order to address the „public 
outcry‟ caused by the unsuccessful prosecution of R v P & 0 European Ferries 
(Dover) Ltd,
224
 where a boat had capsized claiming the lives of 200 people. Cavanagh 
asserts that under the organisational model and the corporate culture doctrine, the 
company would have been successfully prosecuted and convicted of manslaughter.
225
 
Furthermore, the fault element would have been derived from the corporate body‟s 
policies and procedures that failed to implement requisite and adequate safety 
measures.
226
  
 
Australia is the first country that „recognises true corporate fault as the basis for 
criminal liability for offences requiring negligence as well as offences requiring 
subjective fault‟.227 Australia created the concept of „the corporate culture‟ which may 
be defined as an „attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within 
the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate where the offence 
occurred‟.228  
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The provisions of the Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) 
(hereinafter referred to as Act 1995) apply expressly in the same manner to 
corporations as it does to natural persons.
229
 Section 12.2 of Act 1995
230
 is similar to 
vicarious liability as the physical element of the offence, whether a commission or 
omission performed by an employee, agent or officer of the corporation that is acting 
within the confines of his or her employment is attributed to the corporation.
231
 Under 
this doctrine, a corporation will be held liable for „the actus reus of a crime regardless 
of crime regardless of the level of seniority of the offender within the company‟.232 
Moreover, a corporation may be negligent when the conduct of the corporate body 
viewed as a whole is deemed to be negligent.
233
  
 
The fault element pertains to „offences based on either intention, negligence or strict 
liability‟.234 Act 1995 states that where an offence is based on intention, the fault 
element will be “attributed to the corporate body if it “expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence””.235  The principles of the 
Criminal Code seek to establish standard principles for federal offences, which will 
ultimately extend to the regulatory sphere.  
 
The commission of any offence under Act 1995 where the intention, knowledge or 
recklessness was expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted, the fault 
element will be attributed to the corporate body.
236
 This may be established in four 
ways; namely: 
 
First, the conduct was directed or tolerated by the board of directors.  
Secondly, if such conduct was directed or tolerated by a high managerial agent, it 
may be submitted as a defence by the company if it is able to prove on a balance of 
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probabilities that the agent had used due diligence to prevent commission of the said 
offence.  
Thirdly, it may be used to ascertain mens rea of the corporate body pertaining to the 
commission of an offence under Act 1995 and whether the corporation had policies 
and procedures that led to non-compliance with the relevant provisions in place that 
„directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision‟.  
Fourthly, a corporate body that failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that 
required compliance with the relevant provision.
 237    
 
A corporation may be held responsible if upon investigation of the corporate body‟s 
„organisational processes, structures, goals, cultures, and hierarchies‟‟ 238  that a 
corporate culture exists which sanctioned or encouraged the commission of a 
crime.
239
 A court may be able to secure a conviction for a mens rea offence against a 
company if the state can prove that a corporate culture existed within the body 
corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the 
relevant provision.
240
 In terms of the fourth provision, it may be proved that the 
company failed to establish and implement its policies and procedures necessary for 
compliance with the relevant provision.
241
 Therefore, if corporate culture is proved, it 
may be said that the “requisite mens rea is found in the corporate culture” of the 
corporate body as opposed to the intention of the individual.
242
  
 
Furthermore, a corporate body may be able to escape liability pertaining to strict 
liability offences,
243
 provided that an employee, agent or officer or the corporation is 
able to provide a defence of reasonable mistake of fact, that had the facts existed, their 
                                                        
237
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conduct would not have amounted to an offence.
244
 In order to succeed with a defence 
of mistaken facts, the corporation must also prove that it had exercised due diligence 
and care to prevent commission thereof.
245
 
 
Moreover, if it is proved that corporate culture existed and the offence committed was 
as a result of non-compliance, corporate fault may be inferred.
246
 This is known as 
reactive fault and includes the failure of a corporation to implement reasonable 
remedial measures with which to prevent actual or prospective harm caused by its 
employees from ensuing.
247
 Some authors are of the opinion that the concept of 
reactive fault is untenable on the basis that the idea of establishing liability of an 
alleged offense at a later open – ended time frame as opposed to the time of its 
commission or omission is a departure from the norm.
 248
  
Corporate culture may also be referred to as the preventative fault-model whereby 
corporate criminal liability is determined in accordance with a corporation‟s failure to 
introduce and implement policy considerations to „prevent the commission of a 
crime‟. 249  The corporate culture model is incorporated into the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines whereby the courts look to a corporation‟s policies and considerations 
when determining which sentence to impose upon a company. Moreover, it has 
become the norm for corporations to ensure that it has implemented an effective 
compliance program.
250
  
 
In light hereof, the author submits that the organisational model is the most preferred 
or the most appropriate model with which to discern corporate criminal liability. 
Cavanagh asserts that this model is “conceptually sound and has captured the reality 
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of modern decision – making”. 251 Corporate culture doctrine not only captures the 
essence of organisational fault, but it is able to determine true corporate fault as 
opposed to the derivative models of liability which focuses on the unlawful actions of 
an individual or a group of persons.
252
 Corporate fault is determined by a 
corporation‟s policies, procedures and practices that encapsulates its intentions and 
objectives, which is accepted as authoritative within the corporation as it stems from 
corporate decision – making as opposed to the individuals that created it.253  The 
provisions of the Criminal Code acknowledge that corporate entities have corporate 
capacity whereby corporations are in some instances much more powerful than 
individuals and such should be subjected to a different standard of care.
254
 
 
 
2.4.1 Criticism of Organisational model 
 
Many authors are of the opinion that the organisational model is the most preferred 
model with which to establish corporate criminal liability. However, criticisms have 
also been raised against this model.  
 
Cavanagh asserts that the organisational model is „complex‟ as the evidentiary burden 
placed on prosecutors to prove that corporate culture existed may be quite difficult.
255
 
Van der Linde agrees that corporate fault may be difficult to prove, however 
determining personal fault based on an individual‟s “behaviour, may pose far greater 
difficulties and risk of error than determining organisational fault based on corporate 
policies and practices”.256 Moreover, prosecutors may be deterred from using this 
method except in „the most straightforward of cases‟.257 It has been suggested that 
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corporations through the enactment and enforcement of its policies and procedures 
may also create and encourage the commission of crimes.
258
 
 
Cavanagh argues that despite any criticisms raised against this model, his assertion 
remains unchanged in that corporate fault is still the most suitable model with which 
to regulate corporate criminal liability. Rose submits that this doctrine is best suited as 
it recognises that corporations “possess collective knowledge, have a distinct public 
persona, and are capable of committing offences in their own right” through the 
actions of its workforce and failure to implement policies and procedures.
259
 
Wilkinson submits that Act 1995 is the best available legal instrument for establishing 
corporate criminal liability.
260
 
 
The author submits that despite the obvious criticisms, the organisational model 
presents the best and most suitable and transparent method in holding corporate 
bodies criminally liable. Moreover, it is a step in the right direction as it takes away 
the no fault requirement whereby corporate bodies are actually afforded a defense.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter provided an analytical discussion on the four models of corporate 
criminal liability. The discussion herein also proved that not one model provides the 
perfect solution with which to discern corporate liability as each model contains 
numerous shortfalls and criticisms.   
 
The first section dealt with the principle of vicarious liability, which finds application 
in the South African law of Delict and has been codified in section 332 of the CPA. 
Furthermore, a corporate body acquires knowledge and can act and think through its 
representatives.
261
 The author has shown that there are numerous issues pertaining to 
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the applicability of vicarious liability, including holding a person, albeit a juristic 
person who is fictitious in nature, responsible for the criminal actions of a natural 
person. Moreover, corporate criminal liability is only possible upon proving the 
presence of human fault, despite for instance the presence of corporate fault.  
 
The next section dealt with the identification doctrine, application of which is also 
fraught with many issues especially considering that corporate fault is only possible 
upon identifying the controlling mind or senior management of the corporation. In 
practice, it is often difficult to prove who was responsible at the time when the crime 
was committed, resulting in a company evading liability. This doctrine does not apply 
in South Africa, although there are writers who are of the opinion that vicarious 
liability should not extend beyond the controlling minds of the corporation.
262
 
 
Neither vicarious liability nor the identification doctrine considers true corporate fault 
and as such, Cavanagh asserts that derivative models are limited to the notion that a 
corporation is made up of only its human counterparts „when in reality, corporate 
decision-making is often the product of corporate policies and procedures‟.263  
 
The aggregation doctrine is an extension of the vicarious liability and identification 
models whereby corporate criminal liability is determined in accordance with the 
collective minds of the individuals concerned and the corporation itself. Under this 
model, corporate liability isn‟t limited to senior management only but includes the 
collective knowledge from mid to low-level managers. Moreover, the aggregated 
knowledge and negligence of the individuals concerned are attributed to the 
corporation as its own which is used to discern corporate fault.  
 
The last section dealt with organisational fault which takes into consideration true 
corporate fault by examining a corporate‟s policies and procedures in determining 
corporate criminal liability. The author submits that this is the most preferred model 
with which to discern corporate criminal liability as it not only reflects modern day 
decision-making but also recognises true corporate fault. 
                                                        
262
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South African corporate criminal law is based upon a broad interpretation of the 
principle of vicarious liability encased in statute, which encompasses statutory law 
offences and makes provision for common law offences resulting in the criminal 
liability of corporations. Corporations are vicariously responsible for the unlawful 
actions of their employees. The next chapter will provide a discussion pertaining to 
the origins and development of corporate criminal liability with reference to the 
common law (vicarious liability), Roman law, Roman Dutch Law and statutory law. 
Moreover, it will include a critical analysis of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
 
This chapter will provide a discussion on the origins and development of corporate 
criminal liability with reference to the common law (vicarious liability), Roman law, 
Roman Dutch Law and statutory law.  Corporate criminal liability in South Africa is 
derived from the English common law and is based on an extended principle of 
vicarious liability, which was first embodied in section 384(1) of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 (hereinafter the CPEA), which was later 
repealed and replaced with section 332(1) of the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act 
(hereinafter the CPA). This chapter will provide a comparative summary of sections 
384 and 332(1) of the CPEA and CPA, respectively. 
 
This chapter will provide a discussion in respect of section 332(1) of the CPA 
pertaining to the criminality of corporate liability with reference to statutory and 
common law offences and applicable case law. This will include a critical evaluation 
of the provisions of section 332(1) of the CPA with reference to strict liability, 
negligence, intent, fault and supporting case law and arguments from academic 
writers. 
 
This chapter will highlight the notable differences between vicarious liability and 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa and make recommendations to improve 
the current model and legislation with reference to the other derivative models and 
those models used in United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia. 
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South Africa‟s criminal law is a hybrid system based upon the principles of Roman-
Dutch, English, German and uniquely South African elements that are tested in 
accordance with the Bill of Rights as set out in the Constitution of South Africa, 
1996.
264
 Corporate criminal law in South Africa is based upon the principle of 
vicarious liability whereby the unlawful actions of an employee acting within the 
course and scope of his or her employment are imputed to the corporation as its own 
provided that the said employee was at fault.
265
  
 
Snyman states that under the common law, a person cannot be held liable for the 
criminal acts of another unless that person was either a party thereto and had the 
requisite culpability.
266
 This is known as the principle of vicarious liability, which is 
an exception to the common law rule, whereby a person may under statutory law be 
held liable for the criminal acts of another.
267
 
 
It is trite law that only a human being can perform an act and be found liable under 
criminal law.
268
 A corporate body is an exception to this law. Through the application 
of vicarious liability, a corporate body may in certain circumstances engage in 
conduct and be liable for the commission of an offence, through the principle of 
attribution.
269
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266
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3.2 Roman Law 
 
The concept of a corporation or a universitas was developed under Roman law.
270
 
However, corporate criminal liability was unknown.
271
 The first evidence of a 
corporation can be traced back to a family unit in Roman times whereby the man as 
head of the household was considered the Patriarch or head of the corporation, acting 
as its representative, acquiring rights and duties assigned to the corporation which 
included the right to sue and be sued; to hold the family‟s possessions in trust and to 
act as trustee thereof.
272
 The family unit „enjoyed a number of rights traditionally 
reserved for natural persons‟.273 The Patriarch however had no privilege or position 
distinct from his family unit and as such, all rights and responsibilities of the unit 
belonged to the family and he merely acted on their behalf.
274
 The rights and 
obligations of the family unit would devolve upon the heir of the headship, which is 
uniquely characteristic of corporations in that it does not cease to exist upon the death 
of its members.
275
 Corporations never die and the deaths of any one individual 
member has no impact whatsoever on the collective existence of the aggregate body 
of the corporation, nor does it affect the rights and obligations or the continuation of 
the said corporation.
276
 Kahn is of the opinion that in Roman times, a corporation 
could not be held criminally liable, as corporations were deemed incapable of 
committing wrongful acts as they lacked criminal intent and culpability.
277
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3.3 Roman-Dutch Law 
 
In Roman-Dutch Law a corporation was recognised as a legal person with the ability 
to acquire property and to sue and be sued.
278
 De Wet and Swanepoel are not 
convinced as to whether a legal person such as a corporation was capable of 
committing a crime or being punished for wrongful acts under Roman-Dutch law.
279
 
Moreover, under Roman-Dutch law, there seems to have been an unwillingness to 
hold corporations criminally liable, as corporations were deemed incapable of 
committing wrongful acts as they lacked criminal intent and culpability.
280
  
 
3.4 The South African Common Law 
 
There appears to be very little evidence of the existence of corporate criminal liability 
prior to the 20
th
 century in South Africa.
281
 Corporate criminal liability originated 
from the English law and it was regulated by the common law until it was enacted by 
the legislature through section 384 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 
1917 (hereinafter the CPEA).
282
 Snyman asserts that English law „exerted a strong 
influence on South African law in general and criminal law in particular‟, but that the 
English law did not replace the existing Roman-Dutch law.
283
 Under the common law, 
a universitas
284
 or a corporation was recognised as a juristic person capable of 
acquiring criminal liability for the criminal acts of its employees on the basis that it is 
the master of those individuals who had committed the criminal acts.
 285
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In terms of common law, corporate criminal liability is limited to the commission of 
acts that can be performed by a corporate body and as such, a corporate entity could 
not be held responsible for an act where it was impossible for the juristic person to 
commit such an act,
 286
 for example the commission of any crimes that are limited to 
natural persons.
287
  
Under the South African common law, there are many instances where a corporation 
could escape liability for crimes and punishment through the application of the law 
confined to natural persons, these include:
288
  
 
•  (i) Where the conduct demands that a natural person should act, e.g. rape and 
bigamy, and offences, which can only be committed with a human body.  
• (ii) Where the legislature or statute provided that only natural persons can commit 
the offence.  
• (iii) Where the penal provisions for the offence committed cannot be applied to a 
juristic person, i.e. imprisonment or death penalty. Where it is not possible to 
prosecute the corporate body for the offence, the individual who committed the 
offence must be charged.  
 
A corporation is a fictitious entity and as such, is not equipped with the mental 
capacity necessary to formulate its own intention nor the capacity to act on its own, 
instead these actions are carried out by the individuals who comprise it and as such 
corporate bodies cannot be held criminally liable for crimes requiring mens rea
289
 or 
actus reus.
290
  
 
                                                        
286
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Under common law a corporate body cannot be charged with an offence where the 
legislature provides that the commission of a particular crime is limited to natural 
persons only.
291
  
 
Moreover, a corporation may due to its artificial nature escape liability where the 
punishment prescribed for the crime cannot be imposed, for example, imprisonment 
without the option of a fine.
292
 
 
In the light of the above, the author submits that application of the common law has 
numerous shortcomings pertaining to corporate criminal liability resulting in 
corporations escaping liability for the commission of serious offenses. Farisani 
correctly asserts that  
“is not sound to recognize artificial persons and then allow them to escape 
prosecution merely due to the fact that the nature of the (crime and/or) 
punishment prescribed for that particular offence is such that it”  
cannot be ascribed to a corporate entity.
293
 Fortunately, many of these shortcomings 
have been addressed by the enactment of section 332(1) of the CPA, whereby a 
corporate body may be held liable for any offence committed under any law, whether 
statute or by laws or at common law.
294
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3.5 Development of Statutory law in South Africa 
 
Corporate criminal liability was first regulated by section 384(1) of the CPEA 
(original provision), which provided that in any criminal proceedings, under statute or 
the common law, a corporation may be held liable for the crimes committed by its 
directors or servants furthering the interest of the corporation.
295
  
 
Corporate criminal liability under section 384(1) of the CPEA was based on the 
principle of vicarious liability and some authors are of the opinion that this piece of 
legislation was poorly drafted in that it failed to specifically address the general 
principles of corporate criminal liability.
296
 The author submits that section 384 was 
basically mirrored to the common law application of vicarious liability, which 
resulted in numerous procedural and substantive law issues in applying the law to 
corporations.
297
 
 
Section 384(1) of the CPEA was further criticised for its presumptive nature, whereby 
directors and or servants were held personally liable for any criminal actions of the 
corporation, irrespective of whether or not the said person was actually guilty of 
commission of the crime.
298
 The court in R v Van Heerden & Others,
299
 held that a 
company is criminally liable for the acts or crimes of the company director. The court 
stated that the company director sold the frames, made representations while 
endeavouring or furthering the company interests within the section‟s meaning 
regardless of that director not acting in the exercise of their powers and/or in 
performance of their duty as the director of the company within the meaning in 
section 384 (1) of the CPEA. Therefore, the company or business was held criminally 
                                                        
295
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liable for the director‟s acts.  This case indicates that according to the repealed section 
384 (1) of CPEA, Act No.31 of 1917, corporations or companies were prosecuted if 
the state established that the crime was supposedly committed by individuals or 
individual in the course of attempting or advancing the corporation, Additionally, the 
individual could also be charged and personally punished for the offence. 
Interpretation of this provision provided for the application of strict liability that 
presupposes the guilt of the person without the need to establish mens rea or actus rea 
of the alleged offender.
 300
 
 
If the state was able to prove that in terms of section 384(1) of the CPEA that the 
crime was allegedly committed by the person or persons concerned and that these 
persons had acted in furthering or attempting to further the interests of the corporation, 
the corporation would be prosecuted.
301
 Furthermore, the section made provision to 
charge and prosecute the corporate body together with the director or servant involved 
in their personal capacity on the presumption that the director or servant had 
committed the alleged commission of the offence without establishing their respective 
guilt first.
302
 The presumptive nature of this section created a reverse onus whereby 
the accused in this instance bore the onerous duty to prove their guilt.
303
 This of 
course is not in accordance with the 1996 Constitution whereby an accused is 
presumed innocent until proven otherwise by a court of law.
304
 
 
The legislature enacted section 117 of Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 
(hereinafter the Act 1939) to further develop the criminal liability of corporations.
305
 
Section 384(1) of the CPEA as amended states that corporate bodies may be held 
liable for the criminal acts of its directors or servants or agents committed under 
either the statutory law, common law or bylaws in the exercise of their duties, 
furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation or acting under 
express or implied authority.
306
 Furthermore, the acts or omissions of the directors, 
servants or agents are attributed to the corporation and considered to be the acts of the 
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corporation.
307
 Section 384(1) of the CPEA as amended is no longer limited to the 
procedural issues of corporate criminal liability as section 117 of Act 1939 addresses 
the substantive issues of corporate criminal liability, which the legislature failed to 
consider when drafting the original provision. Interpretation of section 117 of Act 
1939 is thus much wider than the traditional concept of vicarious liability. 
 
Moreover, section 117 of Act 1939 provided that directors or servants of the 
corporation can be held personally liable for any offence of the corporation unless 
such person was able to prove that he was not party to nor that he could have 
prevented the commission of the alleged offence.
308
 Farisani avers that section 117 of 
Act 1939 provides that a director or servant may be held criminally liable for the 
actions of another director or servant.
309
 Khan has described this section as „a legal 
straightjacket from which even a Houdini of the law not escape‟.310  
 
In R v Bennett& Co (Pty) Ltd,
311
 an employee of a corporation had in the course and 
scope of his employment, negligently operated a derrick resulting in the death of 
another person. On appeal, it was confirmed that the court a quo had correctly 
imputed the employee‟s negligence to the corporation as its own. The company was 
found guilty of culpable homicide in terms of section 384(1) of CPEA as amended.
312
  
 
Section 117 of Act 1939 was enacted to remove the restrictions that previously 
existed under the common law in respect of corporations who could not be charged or 
convicted of any offence requiring mens rea.
313
 This was achieved by looking at the 
intention of the person who had committed the wrongful act.
314
 This was confirmed in 
R v Durban Baking Co,
315
 where the court stated that a corporate body shall be liable 
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for any offence requiring mens rea as the language used by the legislature was so well 
defined, that no other interpretation could be justified. The court stated further that a 
corporation acts through its representatives and the wrongful acts and intention of a 
director or servant were regarded as the actions and intentions of the corporation 
itself.
316
 
 
In R v Phillips Dairy (Pty) Ltd
317
 the court stated that section 384(1) of CPEA as 
amended prevails as substantive law. The court stated that the section makes any 
limited business criminally liable as the employer even where the private companies 
are not liable. The court stated further that a company may be held criminally liable in 
any instance where the director or servant was acting ultra vires, provided that the 
said director or servant was acting in furthering or endeavouring to further the interest 
of the company. The proviso for is that the act must be;  
a) performed in the exercise of his powers;  
b) in the performance of their duty as a servant or director; and or  
c) in endeavoring or furthering to further the entity or company‟s interests.318 
The acts falling in the application of section 384(1) of CPEA are acts; 
a) performed on the instructions of or by;  
b) with the implied or express permission of the servant or director of the 
company. 
 
Section 381 of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 (hereinafter Act 1955) 
amended and replaced section 384(1) of the CPEA as amended by section 117 of Act 
1939. Section 381 of Act 1955 is a paraphrase of section 384(1) of the CPEA as 
amended by section 117 of Act 1939, which provides that a corporate body may be 
liable for the commission or omission of any act or omission by its directors or 
servants and that the director or servant would be liable for any acts or omissions 
committed by the corporate body unless he could prove that he did not partake therein 
nor could he have prevented the commission of the said offence.
319
 Application and 
enforcement of this provision is problematic in that it creates similar procedural issues 
as described above as it encompasses application of strict liability, which will be 
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discussed below.  
 
In S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (Pvt) Ltd,
320
 a transport company was found guilty of 
culpable homicide through the actions of one of its drivers who by allowing a 
passenger to drive to the bus, resulted in the negligent death of a passenger. It was 
further held that the action of driving the bus was committed in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the company.
321
 The corporation was 
convicted of culpable homicide where the negligence of the bus driver was imputed to 
the corporation.  
 
3.6 Current position on corporate criminal liability in 
South Africa 
 
For the purpose of this section, the author will refer to the decisions pertaining to 
previous sections regulating corporate criminal liability that are relevant in the 
discussion of section 332. 
 
 Section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (hereinafter CPA) is headed 
the „Prosecution of corporations and members of associations‟ and regulates corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa.
322
 In South Africa, corporate criminal liability is 
imputed to the corporate body in terms of section 332(1) of the CPA, which reads as 
follows: 
 
„For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any 
offence, whether under any law or at common law –  
(a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or with 
permission, express or implied, given by a director or servant of that corporate body; 
and 
(b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have been 
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but was not performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant of that 
corporate body, in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as 
such director or servant or in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that 
corporate body, shall be deemed to have been performed (and with the same intent, if 
any) by that corporate body or, as the case may be, to have been an omission (and 
with the same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body‟.  
This section deals with both procedural and substantive law and specifies when a 
corporate entity may be found criminally liable for the commission or omission of 
acts resulting in) crimes.
323
 Farisani describes section 332 of the CPA as a „dual 
approach‟: 324 
“Firstly, it provides for the criminal liability of the corporation for crimes 
committed in furthering or in endeavouring to further the interests of the 
corporation. Secondly, it provides for the criminal liability of individuals 
within the corporation, who are responsible for the crimes committed”. 
 
This section regulates the prosecution of criminal acts committed by juristic persons 
and persons associated with the body corporate including partnerships, that is, entities 
without the express  legal personality.
325
 Moreover, where a corporate body is 
charged with an offence, the fault of the director or servant responsible for the 
wrongdoing is imputed to the corporate body as its own.
326
 Corporate criminal 
liability under section 332(1) of the CPA is based on the principle of attribution 
whereby corporate bodies are held criminally liable for offences committed on its 
behalf by its directors or servants or duly authorised third persons.
327
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The author previously submitted that section 332(1) of the CPA is based on the 
principle of vicarious liability.
328
 Upon interpretation and application, section 322(1) 
of the CPA is much wider than the concept of vicarious liability.
329
 Corporations may 
be criminally liable for all acts whether it falls within or outside the scope of the 
employment, provided that the act or omission was committed in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation.
330
 Moreover, corporate bodies 
may be charged with any offence under either the statutory or the common law, 
whether intention is an element of the offence or not, with the only exception being 
offences of strict liability.
331
 Corporate criminal liability under section 332 of the 
CPA is achieved by imputing the mens rea of the person committing the unlawful act 
to the corporation, thus making it possible for corporate bodies previously exempt 
from certain offices such as culpable homicide and rape to now be convicted 
thereof.
332
  
 
Section 322(1) of the CPA provides that a corporate body may be convicted of any 
offence.
333
 There are however limits to crimes of which a corporate body can be 
charged and prosecuted with under section 332(1) of the CPA, the crime must be of 
such a nature that it is possible to attribute the culpability of the directors to the 
company.
334
 Nana argues that this limitation is debatable considering that offences 
such theft, assault and rape may be attributed to a corporation and that it is important 
to determine whether the applicable law allows acts that constitutes the acts reus or 
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the mens rea of the offence may be attributed to the corporation.
335
 In R v 
Sutherland,
336
 it was held that a certain offence under the then Liquor Act could not 
be committed by a company, since the prohibition was directed at the license-holder 
personally, and a company was not allowed to be a license-holder. 
 
Section 322(1) of the CPA covers attribution of knowledge stating offences accruing 
from the fault of the directors, servants or agents will be attributed to the 
corporation.
337
 The question in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission
338
 was if the knowledge of a senior investment manager is 
attributed to the company. The court stated that the act and mind of the senior 
investment managers was attributed to the Meridian company because attribution of 
knowledge is not confined to the company‟s brains and hands principle, the mind and 
acts of a person lower in the company can also be attributed to the company. All the 
court must establish is if the knowledge and act were projected to be that of the 
business or company.  
 
Burchell submits that the South African approach to corporate criminal liability is 
derivative in nature as it imputes the mens rea of the director or servant to the 
corporate body as its own regardless of whether the act was committed within or 
outside the scope of powers or duty provided that the individual was acting in 
furtherance of the corporate body‟s interest.339 
 
3.6.1 Act 
 
Section 332(1)(a) refers to the commission of any act performed with or without a 
particular intent that includes culpability on part of the corporation whereby the 
corporate body will be held liable for the offences committed by a director, servant or 
agent with either intent or negligence
340
 provided that the act was performed in the 
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exercise of their powers or in the performance of a duty or in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporate body.
341
 
 
The intention of the legislature is clear in that a corporate body may be held 
accountable for the commission or omission of any act, with or without intent, under 
either statute or the common law and may thus be held liable for crimes that could 
initially (in terms of common law) only be committed by natural persons.
342
 
 
Moreover, section 332(1) ascribes the mens rea of the individual committing the 
offence to the corporate body.
343
 Corporate bodies are fictitious in nature and thus 
incapable of committing an offence, as they do not possess a blameworthy state of 
mind; hence the actions of the individual are attributed to the corporate body and are 
considered to be the actions of the corporate body.
344
 
Moreover, a corporate body may be held criminally liable for the actions of its 
directors, servants or duly authorised third person, irrespective of whether the act fell 
outside the scope of their employment or duty provided that the act was committed 
with the intention (or lack thereof) of furthering or endeavouring to further the 
interests of the corporate body.
345
  
 
From the reading of section 332(1) of the CPA, it is clear that it extends the 
application of vicarious liability whereby corporate employers may be held liable for 
the actions of their employees acting outside the confines of the scope of their duty or 
authority.
346
 
 
3.6.2 Fault 
 
Culpability presupposes liability and therefore a person cannot be found guilty of an 
offence without possessing the requisite mens rea or fault.
347
 However, section 332(1) 
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holds a corporate body liable for any offence committed by its employees irrespective 
of the fact that a corporation cannot commit an offence itself, on the basis that the 
mens rea and unlawful actions (actus reus) of the employee are imputed to the 
corporate body as its own.
348
 Corporations are held criminally liable for the actions of 
its employees irrespective of the absence of fault and as such, application of section 
332(1) amounts to strict liability.
349
 
 
3.6.3 Intention 
 
A person is at fault when he or she intentionally commits an unlawful act and is fully 
aware that such act amounts to unlawfulness.
350
 The fault element (mens rea) consists 
of the intention to commit an act and the knowledge that the act is unlawful and may 
be found in dolus directus, dolus indirectus and dolus eventualis.
351
 
 
Section 332(1) provides that the mens rea of the director or servant who committed 
the offence is imputed to the corporation as the mens rea of the corporation. The court 
confirmed in S v Dersley
352
 that corporations are held criminally liable for offences 
committed by its directors and the mens rea of the director at fault is imputed to the 
corporation.
353
 
 
3.6.4 Negligence 
 
It is not only intentional acts that are punishable by law, but also those acts that are 
committed unintentionally and negligently whereby the person at fault failed to 
exercise a reasonable standard of care and did not foresee that his conduct would not 
have the desired result.
354
 
 
Section 332(1) refers to any acts or omissions performed with or without particular 
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intent. This section attributes the criminal liability of its directors or servants of 
corporate bodies for crimes requiring negligence, intent and strict liability to the 
corporate body itself.
355
  
 
Under the common law, a corporate body is a fictitious entity that could not be found 
guilty of a crime requiring negligence.
356
 This was the case in S v Suid-Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie
357
 where the court had interpreted section 332(1) to exclude 
offences requiring negligence.
358
 The decision was taken on appeal and the Appellate 
Division confirmed that this section does in fact apply to negligent acts and omissions. 
Moreover, the court ruled that a juristic person may in terms of section 332(1) of the 
CPA be held liable for the commission of offences requiring negligence committed by 
a director or servant.
359
 The court referred to and confirmed the judgment delivered in 
R v Bennet
360
 in terms of which a corporation was convicted of culpable homicide 
pertaining to the negligent actions of an employee that resulted in the death of another 
employee. The negligent actions of the employee were imputed to the company and it 
was subsequently charged and convicted of culpable homicide.
361
 The court stated 
further that negligence based on an omission can result in culpable homicide if there 
was a positive duty on the corporation to protect persons from serious bodily harm or 
death. The court in Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie
362
 confirmed that section 332(1) of the CPA is wide enough to hold 
corporations liable for the commission or omission of offences requiring intention, 
negligence or strict liability.
363
 
 
The court in S v Dersley
364
 confirmed that the mens rea of the person committing the 
offence must be ascribed to the corporate body in terms of section 332(1) (b) of the 
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CPA.
365
 Moreover, as soon as the commission of a crime has been established, the 
element of fault must be proved before an accused can be charged.
366
 Farisani argues 
that this section refers to culpability and it is clear from the reading of section 332(1) 
that a corporate body will be held liable for acts or omissions by its directors, servants 
or agents committed with intention or negligence.
367
 Farisani avers that it is clear 
from this case that in South Africa, a corporate body will be liable for criminal acts 
committed by a director or servant on the premise that the mens rea of the individual 
is the mens rea of the corporation.
368
 
 
The decisions in Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie
369
 and S v Dersley
370
 embodies the purpose of section 332(1) of the 
CPA whereby the fault of the directors and servants whether intentional or negligent 
are deemed to be the acts of the corporation itself.
371
 
 
3.6.5 Strict liability 
 
The principle actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea is firmly established in our law 
which means that there can be no liability without fault.
372
 Strict liability is only 
possible in terms of statutory crimes
373
 whereby liability of the offender is assumed 
without the requisite need to prove either intention or negligence on the part of the 
accused.
374
 
 
In R v Wunderlich,
375
 De Villiers JP held that:  
“There is no doubt that as a general rule a person is not criminally liable 
unless he has what is called mens rea. This is usually expressed by the maxim: 
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actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. This is a sound rule, for a person is not 
to be subjected to the stigma and other consequences of a crime unless he had 
what is sometimes called a guilty mind. And from this it follows that in 
general a person is not criminally liable for an act or omission, unless he 
himself has committed or omitted the act or has authorised it.” 
Strict liability finds application in public welfare cases whereby the prosecution is not 
required to establish the fault of the corporation, instead it is meant to contribute to an 
effective administration of regulatory legislation and to further encourage compliance 
with the regulatory provisions and to serve as a deterrent to would be offenders.
376
 
 
Section 332(1) includes the liability of a director, servant or duly authorised third 
person for any act or omission, with or without intent, under any law or statute, 
regardless of whether the offence constitutes a crime at the time it was committed 
whereby the corporation is held liable without fault on the basis that the individual is 
at fault.
377
 
 
Application of strict liability in criminal law was found to be unacceptable in S v 
Coetzee & Others
378
 where the court held that the application of strict liability 
(pertaining to individual liability) may be unconstitutional: 
 
“As a general rule people who are not at fault should not be deprived of their 
freedom by the State… Deprivation of liberty, without established culpability, 
is a breach of this established rule.” 
 
The court in Coetzee reiterated that culpability presupposes guilt and referred to the 
court decision in S v Arenstein
379
 whereby no one should be held liable or punished 
for an offence for violations of statutory regulations in the absence of mens rea.
380
 
 
The principle that there can be no fault without liability has been reaffirmed in other 
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jurisdictions as well.
381
 In the US, courts have been slow to accept that culpability is 
not a requirement in statutory offences as was held in United States v US Gypsum 
Co
382
 whereby the prosecution must justify the reasons for dispensing with the mens 
rea requirement. 
 
The English courts are of the opinion that a presumption of mens rea exists although 
this may be rebutted through the interpretation of the statutory provision or the subject 
matter with which it deals
383
 as was held in Sherras v De Rutzen.
384
 
 
The Canadian courts have rejected the principle of no fault liability pertaining to 
negligence in terms of section 7 of the Canadian Charter as was held in R v Wholesale 
Travel Group Inc.
385
 whereby the application of absolute liability and imprisonment 
combined would defeat the fundamental principles of justice in that it may result in 
possibly sentencing someone for a crime when in reality, they have done nothing 
wrong. Furthermore, the courts have declared the felony-murder rule unconstitutional, 
which means that a corporate body cannot be found guilty of culpable homicide, as is 
the case in South Africa.
386
 
 
The Constitutional Court in S v Coetzee
387
 declared that the application of strict 
liability is in conflict with section 35 of the 1996 Constitution as it infringes upon an 
individual‟s right to presumption of innocence and a fair trial and should thus be 
unconstitutional.
388
Van Eerden submits that where the fault lies with a delinquent 
director or servant committing the crime, a corporation is morally blameless and the 
no-fault liability attributed to corporations is thus inconsistent and unconstitutional in 
light of our constitutional values and punishment should not be encouraged nor 
accepted, the delinquent should alone be punished.
389
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Juristic persons are afforded the same rights and protections as natural persons under 
the 1996 Constitution and as such, liability without fault may be unconstitutional on 
the basis that application of section 332(1) of the CPA infringes upon the 
corporation‟s Constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a 
court of law.
390
 
 
Jordaan raises the question whether corporate bodies can raise the defence that the 
application of the no fault rule is an infringement of its right to be presumed innocent 
and submits with reference to S v Manamela
391
 that a juristic person is not entitled to 
the same level of protections as afforded to natural persons on the basis that 
presumption of innocence is used to reduce the possibility of conviction and 
imprisonment.
392
 A juristic person on the other hand can be convicted but it cannot be 
imprisoned.
393
 Jordaan submits further that the constitutionality of the application of 
strict liability should be “decided on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration 
the reasonableness” of the doctrine and intention required of the end result by 
providing a corporate body the defence of due diligence for example.
394
 
 
In Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie,
395
 the 
court states that a corporation may be held liable for negligence despite it having 
shown that it had reasonably exercised due care and was not at fault. This may be 
understood to include a corporation that has certain policies and procedures in place 
but failed to implement these in the circumstances that led to the harm occurring.
396
 
 
Van Eerden argues that corporations should be afforded the defence of due diligence 
as this would enable the company to lead evidence that the commission of the crime 
was committed in violation of its policies and procedures.
397
 It is further submitted 
that the absence of due diligence in section 332(1) of the CPA as a defence is 
unconstitutional as corporate bodies may be held liable for the actions of its directors 
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and servants and despite the absence of fault; it is unable to escape a conviction.
398
 In 
essence, the interpretation of section 332(1) is quite narrow and application thereof 
amounts to strict liability whereby corporate bodies are held liable without the 
existence of fault.  
 
Criminal liability of corporations is regulated by section 332(1) of the CPA whereby 
all the actions (criminal or not) of its members are imputed to the corporate body as 
its own. In light hereof, the author cannot agree with Van Eerden‟s contentions that 
companies should escape liability on the basis that it is morally blameless. The author 
submits further that because corporations are separate to the individuals that comprise 
it and as it exists only in name, all of its actions are only possible through its agents 
(directors or servants) and such, the corporation should be held accountable for the 
actions of those who control and operate the corporate body under its name. Moreover 
and as noted above, the court confirmed that corporate bodies can be held liable for 
the criminal acts or omissions of its directors and servants.
399
 
 
Burchell submits that vicarious liability is based on the principle of strict liability of 
the employer and/or the corporation and that „organisational‟ or „collective‟ fault is 
required on the part of the corporation and on the part of director or servant or third 
party in the company.
400
 It is suggested that a corporation in South Africa may be held 
liable for negligence despite the company having exercised due diligence and care, 
provided that the said company failed to use the safeguard measures in place.
401
 
 
Burchell submits further that having a due diligence programme which precludes 
corporate prosecution is not the best approach for South Africa. Corporations may in 
any event deviate from their own corporate policies and procedures in certain 
circumstances in an attempt to escape criminal liability.
402
  
 
The courts in S v Coetzee & Others and Van Eerden H, Hopkins K & Adendorff C 
were of the opinion that section 332(1) of the CPA creates strict liability and that 
                                                        
398
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399
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application thereof is unconstitutional.
403
 Moreover, it appears from recent case law of 
Du Plessis v S
404
 that South African courts are declining to accept that the statute has 
created strict liability. Furthermore, the application of strict liability places the burden 
of proof on the accused to prove that he is not guilty of the alleged offence; this 
creates reverse onus that may well divest the accused of the opportunity to raise a 
defence that excludes fault.
405
 Jordaan asserts that despite any ruling pertaining to the 
issue of the no-fault rule, application of strict liability may be unconstitutional on the 
basis that it deprives a person of a right to a fair trial and to be presumed innocent.
406
 
 
3.6.6 Express or implied instruction 
 
Section 332(1)(b) provides that a corporation may incur criminal liability for any act 
or omission of a director or servant of the corporate body or a third party acting on the 
express or implied instructions of a director or servant of that corporate body acting in 
the performance of their duties or furthering or endeavouring to further the interest of 
the corporation.
407
  
 
Moreover, section 332(1) provides that a corporate body may be found guilty of an 
offence requiring negligence and that the fault of a director or servant or duly 
authorised agent for the commission of an offence will be attributed to the corporation, 
provided that the acts executed on its behalf are performed by its directors or 
servants.
408
 Van Eerden refers to this as the „jurisdictional requirements‟.409  
 
When one or more of the jurisdictional requirements are present, an irrebutable 
presumption is created under section 332(1) whereby the criminal liability (actus reus 
and the mens reus) of the individual committing the crime is imputed to the 
                                                        
403
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corporation and the corporation is irrebuttably presumed to have committed the said 
act.
410
 In order to escape liability, the corporation must prove that none of the 
jurisdictional elements were present at the time the crime was committed.
411
 
 
3.6.7 Furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation  
 
Section 332(1) stipulates that a corporate body may be held liable for an offence 
where the director or servant acted outside the scope of their powers provided that the 
offence was committed in the process of furthering or endeavouring to further the 
interests of the corporation.
412
 
 
Interpretation of this section is much wider than that of vicarious liability as 
corporations may be held criminally liable for criminal acts or omissions by a director, 
servant or a third party that falls outside the course and scope of employment, 
provided that the offence was committed in furthering or endeavouring to further the 
interests of the corporation
413
 which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
failing to do so may result in the corporation escaping liability.
414
 In S v African Bank 
of South Africa Ltd & Others,
415
 the prosecution‟s failure to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the alleged offence in the furthering 
of or  attempting to  further the interests of the corporation resulted in the bank 
escaping liability.
416
 
 
Vicarious liability is limited to the relationship between the employer and employee 
whereby the employer only incurs liability if the employee was acting within the 
confines of his/her course and scope of employment.
417
 However, the application of 
section 332(1) of the CPA extends corporate criminal liability to include acts or 
omissions that fall outside the course and scope of the employment if it is found that 
the actions of the employee are “about the affairs, or business, or doing the work of 
                                                        
410
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the employer”418as was held by the court in ABSA Bank Ltd v Born Equipment 
(Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd.
419
 
 
Furthermore, in NK v Minister of Safety and Security,
420
 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(SCA) held that the actions of an employee fall within the course and scope of his or 
her employment irrespective of whether the employee has deviated from any 
instruction of his or her employer.
421
 
 
3.6.8 Appearance at trial 
 
Section 332(2): 
 
A corporate body is a fictional being and thus unable to stand trial or appear in the 
dock.
422
 Section 332(2) clarifies this issue and stipulates that a director, servant or 
representative of the corporate body must stand trial on behalf of the corporate body 
and that the charge sheet should clearly state who is being charged and in what 
capacity of the corporation.
423
 Moreover, when instituting criminal proceedings, the 
charge must be unambiguous and therein clearly stated in which capacity the accused 
is being prosecuted, i.e. in his/her personal capacity as a director or servant or as a 
representative of the corporation.
424
 In Herold NO v Johannesburg City Council,
425
 
the charge was vague and thus it was unclear whether the accused was being charged 
in his personal or representative capacity of the corporation.
426
 The court stated that 
the charge sheet should clearly state who is being charged and in what capacity he is 
so being charged in order for the court to decide whether he was being charged in his 
personal capacity or in his representative capacity.
427
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3.7 Common Law and Statutory Law Offences 
 
Under section 332 (1) of the CPA, a corporation may be held liable for any offence 
under statutory or common law.
428
 
 
3.7.1 Common Law Offences 
 
Under the common law, a corporation cannot be held criminally liable for crimes such 
as rape, incest and perjury as these are confined to natural persons,
429
 however Allen 
and Burchell aver that a corporation can be held accountable as an accomplice to a 
crime.
430
 
 
In terms of South African labour law and the common law, an employer has a legal 
duty under sections 12(1)(c) and 24 of the 1996 Constitution and section 8 of the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993 to provide a working environment 
that is safe and free from harassment.
431
 The court in Piliso v Old Mutual Life 
Assurance Co
432
 stated that under the common law an employer has a duty to provide 
a safe working environment for its employees and that an employer may open itself 
up to criminal liability for failing to do so. In this case an employee was being 
harassed by a person unknown to him and as a result, the employee suffered 
psychological harm due to the employer‟s failure to intervene and prevent the harm 
from ensuing.
433
 
 
Burchell argues that the law of negligence including omission to act applies to 
corporate bodies like companies the same way it applies to natural persons.
434
 It is for 
such reason that the courts in S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (Pvt) Ltd
435
 and R v Bennett & 
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Co (Pty) Ltd
436
 held that a corporate body may under section 384(1) of the CPEA be 
convicted of culpable homicide arising out negligence (where the company officials 
forecasted the possibility of death).
437
  
 
In K v Minister of Safety and Security,
438
the Constitutional Court confirmed that a 
corporation may be held vicariously liable for rape.
439
 The policemen were found to 
have acted within the course and scope of their employment as they are bestowed 
with a certain amount of authority to protect vulnerable persons and in doing so, they 
were presented with an „opportunity‟ to rape K and the court found that there was a 
sufficiently close link between their actions and acting within the scope of their 
employment. Moreover, any person who holds a “special or protective relationship 
towards another may be under a legal duty to protect that person from harm” and this 
position of trust includes police officers.
440
 
 
Under United States‟ Federal law and law of torts, a corporate body cannot be held 
liable for acts not committed in furtherance of the corporation‟s interests like rape.441 
However, a corporate body can be held liable for rape under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines
442
 because juristic persons have a legal duty to protect its employees and 
prevent crime through creating and establishing compliance programmes; 
programmes enforced by corporate managers and requiring employees‟ due 
diligence.
443
 Moreover, in the UK, an employer may be held liable as an accomplice 
for an omission where it failed to intervene and stop the criminal behaviour of an 
individual over whom it exerts some form of control.
444
 Burchell provides further that 
a corporation that knowingly provides a working environment that facilitates sexual 
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assault of its employees or foresees the risk thereof and fails to address these issues or 
prevent this type of environment by ensuring that certain measures and systems are in 
place could be charged as an accomplice in the event that one of its employees is 
raped on the premises.
445
 
 
The author agrees with Burchell‟s submission that the state and corporations should 
be brought forward and held accountable for rape. The author submits further that it 
must be of primary concern to the corporate body to ensure that it establishes policies 
and procedures that provides a safe and secure working environment free from sexual 
harassment and to prevent any such incidents from occurring and in the event that it 
does, the corporate body should be sufficiently capable to intercept and manage the 
situation. 
 
As is evident from the discussion, the author has shown that the ambit of section 
332(1) of the CPA is very broad and that it include the criminal liability of corporate 
entities for the commission or omission of any offence, regardless of the nature of 
offence, provided that the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence can be attributed 
to the corporate body.
446
 
 
3.7.2 Statutory Law Offences 
 
Section 332(1) of the CPA holds corporations liable for any statutory offence. 
However not all statutory offences committed by directors or servants can be 
attributed to the corporate body. For example, in S v Sutherland
447
 the court held that 
certain crimes under the then Liquor Act 30 of 1928 could not be committed by a 
company and as such, the company escaped conviction on the basis that the crime 
could only be committed by a natural person as a corporation cannot be the holder of 
a liquor license.
448
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Corporate bodies may commit a variety of offences that include corruption, theft, 
fraud and the disregard for statutes pertaining to the safety and security of its 
workforce and workplace.
449
 Section 332(11) of the CPA therefore stipulates that the 
provisions of this subsection shall be an addition and not a substitution to any other 
law that provides for the prosecution of corporate bodies, directors or servants or 
against other associations of persons and their members.
450
 From the reading of 
section 332(11) of the CPA, it is clear that a corporate body cannot escape liability 
under any other law and may be prosecuted and convicted under any other law 
including section 332(1).
451
 
 
3.7.3 Criminal liability of corporations, directors and servants under the 
Companies Act 
 
The South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereinafter SACA) provides for the 
specific criminal liability of a corporation, director or any person of a company that 
falsifies statements and that is found guilty of reckless conduct and non-compliance 
thereof.
452
 
 
Sections 77 (b) and 218 of SACA have been interpreted to aid section 332(1) of the 
CPA to establish the criminal liability of a director or any other prescribed officer for 
any act committed under statute or the common law since section 332(5) of the CPA 
was repealed.
453
 Section 77 of SACA regulates the delictual liability of directors, 
corporate officials or any other person in the corporation for any loss sustained by the 
company for breach of certain duties prescribed therein or under the common law.
454
 
Section 218 of SACA further regulates the general liability of anyone who causes 
another person to sustain any loss or damage that is a direct result from contravention 
of any part of SACA.
455
 Section 332(5) of the CPA regulated the criminal liability of 
directors and servants. In terms of this section, a director or servant was automatically 
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presumed guilty for any act of a corporation unless the director or servant was able to 
prove that:
456
 
(a) they did not participate in the commission of the offence and; 
(b) they could not have prevented the commission thereof. 
 
The Constitutional Court in S v Coetzee & Others
457
 declared unconstitutional any 
further application of section 332(5). Today, Section 77(9) of the SACA maintains 
that other than proceedings of breach of trust or wilful misconduct, courts have the 
capacity to relieve a company director in part or wholly, from liability as it considers 
fair and just where the court establishes the company director acted reasonably and 
honestly, or it appears fair to excuse the company director with regard to all the case‟s 
circumstances including the director‟s appointment. 
 
3.7.4 Criminal liability of directors or servants within the corporation 
 
Section 332(10) of the CPA defines a director: 
 
“as any person who controls or governs a corporate body or who is a member 
of a body or group of persons which controls or governs a corporate body or 
where there is no such body is a member of the corporate body”.458 
 
The word “director” has an extended meaning “whereby the person who at the time of 
the commission of the offence controlled or governed the corporate body will be 
regarded as a director and be held criminally liable in terms of section 332 of the 
CPA”.459 
 
The word “servant” has not been defined in this section, however section 1 of the 
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Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 defines an employee as: 
 
“(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person 
or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and  
 
(b) any other person who in any manners assists in carrying in or conducting the 
business of an employer”. 
 
Section 332(1) of the CPA refers to any acts committed with or without intent by a 
director or servant and includes acts executed personally by them and acts carried out 
on their instruction with their express or implied permission whereby the culpability 
(mens rea) of the director or servant is imputed to the corporate body and the guilt of 
the director is assumed in terms of section 332(5).
460
 
 
Section 332(5) reads as follows:
461
 
 
“Where an offence has been committed, whether by the performance of any 
act or by the failure to perform any act, for which any corporate body is or was 
liable to prosecution, any person who was, at the time of the commission of 
the offence, a director or servant of the corporate body, shall be deemed to be 
guilty of the said offence, unless it is proved that he did not take part in the 
commission of the offence, and that he could not have prevented it, and shall 
be liable to prosecution therefore, either jointly with the corporation or apart 
therefrom, and shall on conviction be personally liable to punishment 
therefore”. 
 
Interpretation and application of this section provided that a director or servant could 
be found guilty for the offences committed by the corporation which in turn meant 
being found guilty for the crimes committed by other directors or servants of the 
corporate body, provided that those offences were committed in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporate body.
462
 Section 332(5) holds a 
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director or servant of a corporate body liable for the commission of any offence of 
which the corporation is found guilty as set out in section 332(1), unless the director 
or servant can prove that he did not partake in the commission or that he could not 
have done anything to prevent it.
463
 Moreover, in terms of section 332(5) of the CPA, 
directors and servants could in their personal capacity be found liable for the same 
offence committed by a corporate body.
464
 In Herold, N.O v Johannesburg City 
Council,
465
 the court held that the onus of proving that a director or servant did not 
partake in the commission of a crime or that he could not have prevented the 
commission thereof is based on a preponderance of probability which in turn means 
that application of section 332(5) still creates a reverse onus whereby the director or 
servant may still be found guilty of a crime of the corporate body if unable to 
disprove the onus. Furthermore the court stated in S v Moringer,
466
 that when the 
prosecution establishes the guilt of the corporation “the burden of proof shifts to the 
accused to prove that he or she did not participate in the commission of the offence 
and that he could not have done anything to prevent it”.467 The court stated that the 
reverse onus created in section 332(5) leaves the court with no other option than to 
punish an accused that fails to discharge the burden of proof.
468
 
 
Furthermore, section 332(5) is in contrast with the common law position, which 
provides that a director may be held liable for the offences committed by another 
director provided that the said director had participated therein or on the basis of 
vicarious liability or agency.
469
 Nonetheless, as held in S v Coetzee,
470
 Ackermann J 
states that a director or anyone else who satisfies the common-law accomplice 
liability may be held accountable in his or her own right under the common law.
471
 
The court held further that extending criminal liability to servants under section 
332(5) is unwarranted and unjustified as it “constitute(s) a substantial impairment of 
freedom under section 11(1)” of the 1996 Constitution.472  
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The Constitutional Court in S v Coetzee & Others
473
 declared section 332(5) 
unconstitutional as application thereof creates a reverse onus whereby the accused 
(director or servant) is required to prove their innocence, when in reality the state 
should always bear the onus to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
474
 The court 
held that section 332(5) infringes upon a person‟s right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty by a court of law and that application thereof could not be justified in 
terms of the limitations clause as set out in sections 35(3)(h) and 36 of the 1996 
Constitution,
475
 respectively. 
 
3.7.5 Criminal liability of third persons / agents 
 
Although section 332(1) of the CPA does not make use of the word „third person‟, 
further interpretation thereof extends the criminal liability of corporations to include 
the actions or omissions of any authorised third party or agent acting on the express or 
implied instructions of a director or servant of that corporate body.
476
 It may be 
argued that such authorisation given by the director or servant is only acceptable if it 
is given in the exercise of their powers and duties and in furthering or endeavouring to 
further the interest of the corporation.
477
 
 
Third person may refer to persons not employed by the corporate entity; or self-
employed persons or independent contractors, but who are only authorised to act on 
the express or implied permission of the director or servant of the corporate body.
478
 
 
In Worthy v Gordon Plant Ltd,
479
 a self-employed person was contracted to be a 
traffic manager of the company was regarded as a third person in that his conduct and 
mens rea was attributed to the company 
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3.7.6 Criticism of section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
 
Criminal law defines certain standards of human behaviour as crimes and provides 
punishment for those persons with „criminal capacity who have unlawfully and with a 
guilty mind committed a crime‟.480  
 
Section 332(1) of the CPA holds corporate bodies criminally liable for the acts and 
omissions of its directors, servants and duly authorised persons. Corporate bodies are 
fictitious in nature and exist independently from the members that comprise it and as 
such, it cannot purport to have mind capable of making reasonable and rational 
decisions.
481
 However, much controversy exists as to whether and how this system 
should apply to the unlawful acts of a corporation, which unlike natural persons are 
incapable of thinking for itself.
482
 
 
Section 332(1) of the CPA poses procedural problems as to who can be summonsed 
and stand in the dock and who must be held responsible for the actions of corporate 
bodies. Moreover, this section presents a further challenge to criminal law as it 
pertains to an element of fault that assumes individual culpability, which corporations 
lack and begs the question as to how corporations can assume fault and/or be held 
accountable for the commission of criminal acts as corporate bodies are not capable of 
thinking or acting on their own.
483
 
 
Application of section 332(1) of the CPA is quite harsh and may be considered 
unconstitutional in relation to its treatment of juristic persons. Jordaan suggests that 
the South African legislature amends the regulation to limit offences to regulatory 
offences
484
 that are committed by directors with the exclusion of servants.
485
 Van der 
Linde and Borg – Jorgensen are of the opinion that in doing so, it may have the effect 
of excluding matters that are “typically prosecuted against companies”.486  
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Furthermore, by limiting the ambit of section 332(1) to regulatory offences with the 
exclusion of truly criminal offences, the censuring and stigmatising effect of the law 
would be defeated.
487
 However attractive this approach may seem, it is not 
recommended as this provision is still based on the principle of vicarious liability, 
which includes strict liability by holding the corporate body responsible for the acts of 
its members without acquiring fault.
488
 
 
The principle of vicarious liability regulates the relationship between the employer 
and the employee pertaining to the commission of a crime and is limited to acts 
committed within the course and scope of the employee‟s employment.489 There are 
authors who are of the opinion that section 332(1) is based on the principle of 
vicarious liability.
490
 Section 332(1) however is much broader than the principle of 
vicarious liability as it extends the liability of corporations to include all acts or 
omissions of directors, servants or duly authorised third persons who acted within or 
outside the scope of their powers or duties whilst endeavouring to further the interests 
of the company.
491
 Moreover, section 332(1) may as a result of being too broad be 
found to be inconsistent with Constitution as it may infringe upon guaranteed 
constitutional rights.
492
  
 
Section 332(1) holds a corporate body liable for crimes based on fault, whether 
intentional or negligent and as such, corporate bodies may be prosecuted and held 
liable for any acts or omissions of its directors, servants and third parties under statute 
or the common law.
493
Moreover, corporations may be held liable for the commission 
of all common law or statutory offences including culpable homicide,
494
 theft,
495
 
fraud,
496
 assault
497
 and rape
498
 provided that the offence can be committed by a 
corporate body and that the fault or the mens rea of the actors can be imputed to the 
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corporate body.
499
 The only exception recognised by our courts are certain offences 
prescribed in the Liquor Act 30 of 1928 that are confined to natural persons as was 
held in S v Sutherland.
500
  
 
Moreover, a corporate body may be held vicariously liable for an offence despite 
having exercised due diligence by ensuring that it had certain policies and procedures 
in place to prevent the commission of an offence.
501
 Despite taking reasonable 
precautionary measures, corporate bodies are not entitled to raise due diligence as a 
defence.
502
 This in essence means that a corporate body is found guilty for the 
unlawful actions of its members without the presence of the requisite of fault, which 
amounts to strict liability.
503
 The mens rea of directors, servants or third parties is 
imputed to the corporation and these acts are regarded as the corporate body‟s own 
and as such, the corporation may be held criminally liable on the basis that the 
individual is guilty.
504
  
 
In South Africa, juristic persons are afforded similar and/or specific rights and 
freedoms as those of natural persons as set out in the Bill of Rights
505
 and as such, the 
regulation of corporate criminal liability under section 332(1) of the CPA, may if 
challenged, be found to be unconstitutional.
506
 Corporate bodies are intangible, it 
lacks a physical existence and without the ability to think and act for itself, it may be 
argued that there are certain rights as set out in the Bill of Rights, for instance the 
right to life and the right to be presumed innocent that should only be afforded to 
natural persons.
507
 Jordaan argues however that the application of section 332(1) of 
the CPA infringes upon a corporate body‟s constitutional right under sections 35(3)(h) 
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a court of law and section 35(3)(f) 
could hinder a corporation‟s right to a fair trial.508 Jordaan avers that no real reason 
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exists as to why a corporate body should not be afforded all of the rights set out in 
section 35(3) of the Constitution.
509
  
 
Jordaan submits further that unless a “fundamental human right is clearly inapplicable 
to a juristic person”, that a two stage interpretative approach should be adopted in 
deciding whether the right in question is applicable to the corporate body or justify 
the limitation thereof.
510
 This includes determining whether the corporate entity is a 
holder of the rights in question and whether there are any corresponding duties 
imposed on the state. A generous approach should be followed in the first stage to see 
whether the right in question applies to a corporation. If it is found to apply, then the 
corporate body is the holder thereof and a duty rests upon the state to protect the right. 
If the state fails to protect the right, the second stage of the enquiry will proceed 
whereby the state must justify the infringement of the rights in terms of the limitation 
clause.
511
 
 
One of the main points of criticism levied against corporate criminal liability pertains 
to the over-broadness of section 332(1) whereby the liability of corporations are only 
possible through the attribution of fault of a director or servant, without attribution, a 
corporate body cannot be prosecuted or punished.
512
 Hence why certain writers have 
suggested that the South African legislature adopt a different approach in order to 
secure a conviction of a corporate body that includes an organisational approach in 
determining corporate criminal liability.
513
 Jordaan submits that section 332(1) is out-
of-date in relation to other countries that impose either a collective or organisational 
model of liability.
514
 Jordaan submits further that corporate criminal liability should 
be “assessed independently” from the members of a corporate body by incorporating 
an approach based on organisational fault that seeks to establish liability through the 
aggregation of conduct or through a corporation‟s policies and procedures as opposed 
to attribution of individual fault only.
515
In Belgium, the legislature in determining 
corporate liability developed the doctrine of participation whereby individual fault is 
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not excluded; instead the individual will be prosecuted alongside the corporate body 
for the same offence requiring mens rea.
516
However in determining negligence, the 
state may only prosecute the corporate body or the individual at fault, not both.
517
 
 
The constitutionality of section 332(5) was discussed under strict liability above 
whereby the provisions thereof was declared unconstitutional in that it created the 
reverse onus in terms of which the guilt of the director or servant was automatically 
assumed and that such director or servant bore the burden to prove their innocence 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
518
 
 
The Australian criminal code recognises “true corporate fault” whereby corporations 
may be held liable for offences requiring both intention and negligence.
519
 Moreover, 
the mens rea of its employees, officers or agents are imputed to a corporation that 
“expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence” 
and if it is found that the offence was caused as a result of the corporation‟s corporate 
culture.
520
 Furthermore, a corporate body may evade liability in respect of strict 
liability offences it is able to prove that it had exercised due diligence and care.
521 
 
The US model is based on the superior respondeat doctrine
522
and the principle of 
aggregation which is similar to the organisational model in that it rejects the idea that 
corporate liability is only possible through the unlawful actions of one person, instead 
liability is determined through the aggregated intentions and negligence of its 
individual representatives.
523
 
3.8 Conclusion 
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In this chapter, the author provided a discussion on the influences and development of 
corporate criminal liability over the ages into what it is now as set out in section 
332(1) of the CPA. It may be safe to deduce from the discussion contained herein that 
South African law is made up of the English common law of corporations and Roman 
law. 
 
The author discussed the development of South African corporate criminal liability, 
which has progressed from the narrow interpretation of the principle of vicarious 
liability, which was limited to the relationship between employer and employee for 
example. The discussion included an assessment of the enactment of the section 
384(1) of the CPEA provided that in any criminal proceedings, under statute or the 
common law a corporation may be held liable for the crimes committed by its 
directors or servants furthering the interest of the corporation.
524
 Despite its 
shortcomings, this section paved the way for the criminal liability of corporate entities 
in South Africa.
525
  
 
The author provided an analytical discussion of section 332(1) of the CPA, which is 
the current legislation that holds corporations criminally liable for the unlawful acts or 
omissions of directors and servants committed in the course and scope of their 
employment and for acts that are committed outside the scope of their duty in the 
furtherance of the interests of the corporation.
526
 The author has shown that upon 
interpretation thereof, that section 332(1) is much wider than the initial common law 
position of vicarious liability. Moreover, section 332(1) provides that corporate 
bodies may be liable for the commission or omission of any offence under statute or 
the common law and as such, corporations could no longer escape liability in respect 
of crimes initially limited to natural persons as held under the common law.  
 
The author provided a discussion pertaining to the common law and statutory 
offences of which a corporate body can be held liable for and provided a breakdown 
thereof. 
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The author dealt with the constitutionality of section 332(1) of the CPA. The author 
has shown that there are numerous issues pertaining to the applicability of vicarious 
liability as embodied in section 332(1), including holding a person, albeit a juristic 
person who is fictitious in nature, responsible for the criminal actions of a natural 
person. Moreover, corporate criminal liability is only possible upon proving the 
presence of human fault, despite for instance the presence of corporate fault.  
 
The author also provided a discussion on section 332(5) of the CPA whereby the 
Constitutional Court in S v Coetzee & Others
527
 declared this section unconstitutional, 
as application thereof creates a reverse onus whereby the director or servant was 
required to prove their innocence, beyond a reasonable doubt.
528
 The court held that 
section 332(5) infringes upon a person‟s right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty by a court of law and that application thereof could not be justified in terms of 
the limitations clause as set out in sections 35(3)(h) and 36 of the 1996 
Constitution,
529
 respectively. 
 
The author submits has demonstrated that the South African approach to corporate 
criminal liability may not be ideal considering the constitutional implications on the 
rights of corporate bodies. Moreover, that the South African model should be 
amended to reflect the change of the times by incorporating the organisational model 
with which to discern corporate fault and move away from the derivative approach 
based on the principle of attribution.  
 
The next chapter will provide a discussion on the theories of punishment, including 
the preventative theory, deterrence theory, individual deterrence theory and general 
deterrence theory and the retribution theory. The author will also examine the current 
situation pertaining to the punishment of corporations and it will include a discussion 
pertaining to financial sanctions and whether these are deterrent enough and will 
provide alternate methods of corporate punishment.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT AND CORPORATE 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, the author examined corporate criminal liability under section 332(1) of 
the CPA. The author showed that this section is based on an extended version of the 
concept of vicarious liability whereby corporate bodies are held criminally liable for 
the acts or omissions of a director or servant. The acts or omissions are imputed to the 
corporation and regarded as the acts of the corporate body, this is known as the 
principle of attribution. The author examined the constitutionality of section 332(1), 
which has yet to be assessed by the courts and measured in accordance with the BOR 
as set out in the Constitution of South Africa. This chapter follows on the previous 
chapter as the author will examine whether the financial sanctions imposed on 
corporations in terms of section 332(2)(c) of the CPA is the most appropriate method 
with which to punish   and deter corporate offenders.  
 
In this chapter the author will provide a discussion on the purpose of punishment of 
corporations and an analytical exploration of the theories of punishment and corporate 
criminal liability including deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and prevention. The 
author will evaluate whether it is indeed appropriate to punish corporations for 
transgressions against individuals and the community as a whole and whether the 
financial sanctions imposed are an effective deterrent against the commission of 
corporate crime. Moreover, the author will examine the effectiveness of financial 
sanctions under section 332(2)(c) of the CPA. The author will include comparisons to 
the enforcement of the punishment imposed in other countries for corporations found 
guilty of corporate crime.  
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4.2 Purpose of Punishment 
 
Corporations are inanimate and do not possess a personal body and it is for this reason 
that corporate entities are considered less than desirable to be punished. Moreover, 
corporate bodies are rational entities incapable of thinking for themselves or 
formulating an opinion, all of these actions are executed by the natural persons, which 
comprises the corporate body.
530
  
 
Criminal law was developed in response to the need to regulate unlawful human 
action.
531
 When a corporation is prosecuted and found guilty, the court is obliged to 
impose the prescribed punishment.
532
 The use of criminal law to prevent and 
prosecute the unlawful actions of corporations has always been met with difficulty, as 
corporations are fictitious entities that are only able to act through its members.
533
 
This begs the question whether it is indeed desirable and justifiable to punish a 
corporation.  
 
Sarre avers that criminal law at best plays a minor role in regulating and controlling 
corporate criminality.
534
 Sarre submits that criminal law should not be the preferred 
course of action with which to hold corporate offenders liable as large companies 
have unlimited funds available at their disposal with access to the best lawyers that 
money can buy who is then able to employ delaying tactics that might outlive any 
pressures that led to the initial institution of charges against the corporate body.
535
 
 
Under the South African model, imposing financial sanctions is the only form of 
punishment available to the state for the successful prosecution of corporate bodies.
 
536
 This is based on the traditional premise that corporations, unlike its human 
counterparts, cannot be incarcerated and as such, the only appropriate option available 
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for the punishment of a corporate entity is the imposition of a financial sanction.
537
  
This begs the question whether it is indeed appropriate and or justifiable to punish 
corporations for its transgressions against individuals and the community as a whole. 
The question arises whether the financial sanctions imposed under the present model 
against corporate entities are an effective deterrent against the commission of 
corporate crime and to ensure that corporations take the necessary preventative 
measures to avoid future harms from occurring. The author submits that the success 
of corporate criminal liability is dependent on the effectiveness of the punishment 
imposed on the corporate body.
538
 Wells asserts that corporations have a distinct 
advantage over human beings in that they cannot be subjected to the same „hardships 
and degradation that incarceration entails‟ when they enter the criminal justice 
system.
539
  
 
4.3 Theories of Punishment 
 
Criminal law is based on a system of state enforced penalties whereby a wrongdoer is 
punished for his transgressions. A link exists between the punishment imposed and 
the criminal law.
540
 What follows is a consideration whether the punishment imposed 
on the accused is justifiable.
541
 When the criminal liability of an accused is 
determined,
542
 the state must impose a sentence that is in proportion to the crime 
committed.
543
 The theories of punishment are important in that it directly affects the 
principles of criminal liability and defences provided to an accused and provides for 
the justification of and the type and scope for imposing punishment on an 
individual.
544
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The theories of punishment may be classified according to the absolute and relative 
theories, which further distinguishes between the retributive, preventative, deterrent 
and reformative theories.
545
 It must be determined when and how and if it all, these 
theories of punishment apply to corporations.  
 
4.3.1 Absolute and Relative theories 
 
A distinction may be drawn between absolute and relative theories of punishment; the 
former is based on the retributive theory whilst there are a number of relative theories 
including prevention, deterrence and reformative.
546
 These will be discussed below. 
 
4.3.1.1 Absolute theory 
 
4.3.1.1.1 Retribution theory 
 
The retribution (also known as „just deserts theory‟) theory examines  the harmfulness 
of the crime and the degree of fault of the accused to measure the punishment to be 
imposed by prescribing a sentence that is fair.
547
  The purpose of the retributive theory 
is aimed at punishing the criminal acts of a person and the punishment imposed on the 
accused is justified for his criminal behaviour.
548
 Punishment of the offender is 
accepted as just deserts for his or her unlawful actions and is thus considered as 
deserved punishment for the commission of the crime.
549
  
 
Imposing punishment on an accused is aimed at providing justice for the victim
550
 and 
restoring the legal order, which was affected by the commission of the crime.
551
 
Moreover, the purpose of punishment has been described as a means to make the 
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accused suffer, not because it is good for him or the suffering will deter him from 
committing a crime in the future.
552
  
 
Snyman states that punishment, as „retribution is a vindication of, or justification for 
the restoration of the moral balance which is the bonding element of a just society‟ 
whereby imposing punishment sends out a clear message that the „values and rights‟ 
of „law-abiding citizens are upheld and protected‟ by the state.553 
 
Snyman states that retribution replaces the primitive idea of vengeance that 
encompasses the notion a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye
554
 and instead 
incorporates punishment imposed by statute on the offender.
555
 Moreover, the 
punishment imposed must be in proportion to the crime committed.
556
  
 
Retribution ensures that the punishment imposed is not only proportional to the harm 
caused but also considers the interest of the accused and the society in general which 
equates to the principle of equality which in turn is crucial to the values that underpins 
our democratic society.
557
  
 
Punishing the corporate offender raises many issues, for instance, „should the 
corporate be punished and who within the corporation should be punished?‟558 Baron 
Thurlow states that corporates has „no soul to be damned, no body to be kicked‟.559  
Clough and Mulhern argues that since  
“corporates are inanimate objects which cannot suffer or feel shame, retribution 
in the sense of just desserts and moral condemnation of society cannot be 
exacted in any meaningful way”.560  
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Moreover, retribution requires that punishment only fall onto people who are morally 
at fault and who willingly and intentionally engaged in any wrongdoing.
561
  Snyman 
states further that corporate entities as an abstract being lacks personal responsibility 
and moral blameworthiness and as such, it is difficult to attach the concept of 
retribution to a corporate.
562
  In light hereof, the author submits that the theory of 
retribution is not applicable in the punishment of corporate offenders. 
 
4.3.1.2 Relative theories 
 
4.3.1.2.1 Preventative theory 
 
Bentham,  the founder of this theory states that punishment would act as a deterrent 
only if it „were applied swiftly, certainly, and severely‟.563 
 
The primary purpose of the preventative theory is to incite fear by imposing harsher 
sentences in order to prevent the offender or would be offenders from committing 
further and/or similar offences during that period.
564
  
 
The secondary purpose is to prevent repetition of the offence or similar offences 
whereby the offender is incarcerated or incapacitated, thus protecting society from 
incurring further harm.
565
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Incapacitation or disabling of the offender may include life imprisonment of an 
accused found guilty of murder or the forfeiture of an accused‟s driver‟s license for 
driving under the influence of alcohol or any other narcotic substance.
566
 Therefore, it 
may be argued that the preventative mode not only acts as an effective deterrent but 
also as a preventative measure in combatting crime.
567
  
 
Bentham‟s theory is based on this premise that societal and civil harmony is best 
ensured by the incapacitation of an offender by curtailing future harm and the 
possibility of future transgressions.
568
 However, it may be argued that incapacitation 
is not always permanent as it only affects the opportunity and ability of an accused to 
commit a criminal act
569
 and does not necessarily act as a deterrent against or prevent 
other would be offenders from committing a crime.
570
 
 
Snyman states that the preventive and deterrent theories may at times overlap, since 
both of these theories may be viewed as methods of preventing the commission of a 
crime.
571
 Under South African legislation, only financial sanctions may be enforced 
against corporate offenders.
572
 The author submits that this theory of punishment may 
only be effective against smaller corporate entities that does not have access to large 
sums of money. Moreover, the author argues that the incitement of fear or the 
imposition of financial sanctions again is only probable against smaller corporate 
entities as opposed to larger entities with access to large sums of money. Furthermore, 
corporations cannot be incarcerated due to its fictious nature, nor can it be 
incapacitated as there are no allowances or laws found in the South African legislature 
pertaining to the punishment of corporations.  
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4.3.2 Deterrence theory 
 
The deterrence theory is based on the works of Hobbes, Beccaria and Bentham that 
„relies on the severity, certainty and celerity‟ of the punishment imposed on the 
individual.
573
  
 
The purpose of deterrence is to deter offenders and would be offenders from 
committing a crime and the more severe the punishment or sentence imposed the 
greater the belief is that it will deter would be offenders from engaging in criminal 
behaviour.
574
  
 
Under the deterrence theory, it is hoped that would be offenders would actually think 
about the possible ramifications of their unlawful actions before acting and that the 
threat of similar punishment for a previous offence would serve as a deterrent from 
committing further crimes.  
 
Bentham argues that all forms of punishment cause harm and that penalties are 
regarded as evil unless utilised for the greater good by averting and reducing the 
criminal behaviour of offenders.
575
 He argues further that when punishment is 
imposed in excess of what is required to deter would be offenders from violating the 
law, this is unjustified.
576
 Furthermore, the certainty of punishment for any 
wrongdoing and the swift imposition thereof is also regarded as a deterrent for 
crime.
577
  
 
A distinction must be drawn between individual (specific) and general deterrence 
whereby the former refers to an individual that is deterred from committing a crime 
and the latter refers to the community as a whole that is deterred from committing a 
crime.
578
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4.3.2.1 Individual deterrence theory 
 
Individual deterrence refers to the punishment imposed on offenders, the purpose of 
which is to serve as a deterrent to prevent offenders from reoffending or would be 
offenders from committing a crime for fear of receiving a similar or a more harsh 
form of punishment.
579
  
 
Individual deterrence works in two ways whereby an offender is imprisoned for a 
period of time rendering him incapable of committing further offences; and the 
incarceration of the offender is developed with the notion that detainment should be 
„so unpleasant‟ that it will act as a deterrent for future criminal behaviour.580 In most 
instances the incarceration of an offender is temporary and it may be argued that it is 
an ineffective mechanism with which to adequately deter offenders upon their release 
from prison.
581
 Moreover, imprisonment may harden criminals as they have become 
accustomed to the hardships of prison life and as such, incarceration as a deterrent 
becomes futile.
582
 
 
Snyman argues that individual deterrence is futile considering that at least 90% of 
criminals continue to reoffend after their release from prison.
583
 Mishra submits that 
deterrence alone is not sufficient in addressing punishment and that focus should 
extend to include the rehabilitation of criminals and the improvement of prison 
conditions.
584
 
 
Moreover, due to its incorporeal nature, corporations cannot be personally punished 
or incarcerated. Under South African legislation, a court may only impose a financial 
sanction on a corporate body convicted of a crime.
585
 Wells asserts that by imposing 
financial penalties on corporate bodies, such punishment will act as a deterrent against 
would be corporate offenders as it encourages good business practice but also 
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discourages criminal behaviour.
586
 The author submits that this theory may deter 
smaller firms, as they may not necessarily have access to large amounts of financial 
resources. However, this theory may have little to no effect on larger firms and may 
only persuade and encourage corporations to change its compliance strategies so as to 
avoid incurring financial penalties.
587
 
 
4.3.2.2 General deterrence theory 
 
General deterrence is based on the concept of individual deterrence and refers to the 
effect of the punishment imposed on the individual on the community in general, 
whereby anyone who is found to have committed a crime will be prosecuted and 
punished accordingly.
588
 General deterrence is also based on the premise of fear 
whereby the imposition of a punishment is intended to send a message that „crime 
does not pay‟ and that all crime will be punished.589  
 
The purpose of the theory is to deter society as a whole from committing a crime and 
the success of this theory depends on how strong the probabilities are that an offender 
would be caught, convicted and serve out the sentence as opposed to the severity of 
the sentence.
590
 Furthermore, Snyman asserts that the effectiveness of this theory 
depends entirely on the reasonable presumption that an offender will be found and 
charged by the police, resulting in the successful prosecution of the accused by the 
court whereby the offender is convicted and sentenced accordingly without the 
possibility of escaping prison or being discharged on parole too early. 
 
Snyman argues further that the probability of an offender (natural person) being 
caught and successfully tried in South Africa is rather low, for example, there may be 
police or prosecutorial corruption, the respective departments may be understaffed, 
the police officials or prosecutor may lack the necessary training and or knowledge 
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required to process, prosecute and secure a conviction.
591
 He avers further that in 
considering the aforementioned, it pays to be a criminal in South Africa as the 
likelihood of being caught and brought to justice is somewhat slim. For the reasons as 
stated, Snyman argues further that the theory of general deterrence may find limited 
degree of application in South Africa.
592
 
 
The author submits that Snyman‟s hypothesis may be highly probable if applied to 
corporate offenders on the supposition that the imposition of financial sanctions is not 
deterrent enough to prevent corporate bodies from committing corporate crime. 
 
The author submits further that the legislation dealing with corporate criminal law is 
in a much-needed state of reform. Furthermore, the purpose of deterrence is to incite 
fear whereby persons or corporate bodies refrain from engaging in criminal conduct 
for fear of punishment. Therefore, general deterrence may only prove successful 
against corporations that are motivated by fear of financial sanctions, and in the same 
breath, may thus prove to be ineffective against corporations that are not motivated by 
fear.
593
 Whether general deterrence is applicable to corporations under South African 
law remains to be seen and the likelihood of whether the corporate entity will be 
prosecuted depends on further investigation into the crime committed by the corporate 
entity.
594
 
 
4.3.3 Reformative or Rehabilitation theory 
 
The purpose of the reformative or rehabilitative theory is based on the premise that 
the punishment imposed is meant to reform or rehabilitate the offender by providing 
him with the tools necessary to become a law-abiding citizen once more and be 
introduced back into society.
595
 Under the reformative theory, emphasis is placed on 
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the rehabilitation of the offender as opposed to the commission of the crime, the 
punishment imposed or the deterrent effect.
596
  
 
According to this theory, „a criminal is not born but made by the environment of 
society‟ and reformists are further of the opinion that prisons should be converted in 
rehabilitation centres with its central aim  focused on reforming the criminal and it is 
up to society to shoulder the burden of reforming the criminal.
597
 Snyman correctly 
asserts that this theory should be rejected as it not only undermines the core principles 
of justice but is also in conflict with the interests of society.
598
 Moreover, this theory 
only considers the interests of one party, the criminal and in no way does this serve to 
regulate and restore the legal order that has been disturbed by the offender.
599
 This 
theory is only beneficial for natural persons who may be ordered to undergo some 
form of rehabilitation or reformation such as anger management. 
 
The author submits that this theory does not apply to corporations, as corporate 
entities are inanimate and cannot be detained and are thus unable to go through a 
process of rehabilitation.  
 
4.4 Punishment of corporate offenders  
 
Corporations are faultless entities incapable of committing a wrong, hence it may be 
said that the concept of criminal liability and the attribution of fault as we understand 
it does not apply to corporations.
600
 Wong asserts that the challenge in determining 
corporate criminal liability rests on the attribution of fault of a company with a 
common objective and „divided responsibilities‟.601  
 
Corporations are juristic persons, created in terms of statute and are vested with legal 
personality and are the bearer of rights and duties that are not shared with natural 
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persons. This is in line with Bucy‟s philosophy that a corporation has an identifiable 
persona and „ethos‟ separate to those who comprise it.602 
 
Under section 332 of the CPA, corporate entities may be charged with the 
commission or omission of any criminal act held under statute or the common law, 
except those crimes limited to natural persons. In South Africa, the interpretation of 
section 332(1) of the CPA is wide enough to include all statutory and common law 
crimes for which corporations can be held liable and accountable, including culpable 
homicide
603
 and rape,
604
 the commission of which was initially limited to natural 
persons only. What follows is whether the punishment imposed on a corporate body 
can be justified considering that it is a faultless intangible entity without a physical 
body. What is notable under section 332 is that when a corporation is charged, it is the 
name of the director in his representative capacity  that appears on the summons and 
consequently, it is the director in his representative capacity upon whom the financial 
sanction is imposed.  
 
When corporations are sued for negligent acts, it may be sanctioned by the imposition 
of a fine or be subject to a common law claim for damages for compensation.
605
 
Imposition of financial sanctions on corporations for their civil and criminal wrongs 
allows victims to claim compensation and ensures that corporations are punished for 
the offences that they have committed against individuals or society.
606
  
 
Moreover, the purpose of holding corporations accountable for its transgressions and 
enforcing sanctions against an entity is meant to act as a deterrent to would be 
corporate offenders and also used to balance the scales of justice by restoring the legal 
order as held under the retributive theory. 
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In light of the above, the author submits that a greater form of responsibility is 
bestowed upon the corporate entity as it has a significant impact on the community 
within which it operates and society as a whole as it provides employment and 
stimulates the economy, it may also be the cause of great disasters resulting in serious 
harm or accidental deaths of its employees, for example.
607
 It may be said that this 
places an even greater responsibility on corporations to ensure the safety and security 
of its employees in the workplace and the community as a whole.  
 
Friedman asserts that corporations should also be subjected to moral indignation and 
that corporate bodies deserve to be punished alongside its human counterpart.
608
 
Moreover, punishment is necessary as it serves as a deterrent against the controlling 
minds of the corporation that all criminal acts are prohibited and will be prosecuted 
and punished accordingly.
609
 
 
The author submits that it is essential to ensure that corporations are held accountable 
for their transgressions against individuals or the community as a whole, whether 
criminally or civilly and that the appropriate punishments (sanctions) are enforced.  
 
4.5 Sentencing the corporate offender 
 
The only form of punishment that may be imposed on a corporate offender in South 
Africa is a fine as held under section 332(2)(c) of the CPA.
610
 The legislature‟s 
intention is clear in that there are no other forms of punishment available to a court 
when imposing punishment on a corporate body. This begs the question whether the 
imposition of financial sanctions are indeed „an appropriate, adequate and effective‟ 
means with which to punish corporate crime.
611
 The reasons for punishing the 
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corporate offender may be determined according to the theories of punishment.
612
 
 
4.5.1 Are financial sanctions deterrent enough 
 
One of the main challenges facing the effectiveness of corporate criminal law is the 
imposition of punishment on corporate offenders based on the narrow-minded 
approach that corporate bodies cannot be incarcerated like a human being because of 
its abstract nature.
613
 Moreover, scholars who prefer to regulate corporate liability by 
adopting a strict or civil liability approach to corporate crime agree that imposing 
financial sanctions is the only rational penalty available on the basis that corporations 
cannot be imprisoned.
614
  
 
The only form of punishment available against the corporate offender under section 
332(2)(c) of the CPA is financial sanctions.
615
 The author submits that this section is 
deeply flawed, firstly, financial sanctions are not the only form of punishments 
available against the corporate offender
616
 and secondly, it fails to provide any 
alternative methods of punishments. This begs the question whether the imposition of 
a fine is an effective mechanism with which to deter corporate criminals and combat 
corporate crime. 
 
The effectiveness of financial sanctions as a deterrent or its appropriateness as a 
retributive is open to criticism. It may be argued that financial sanctions are only 
effective if it has the ability to inflict some damage on the corporation. Moreover, 
financial sanctions imposed should reflect the severity of the crime committed and the 
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financial means of the offender.
617
 Wells submits that this is not always possible as 
the offences with which corporations are charged are in accordance with the 
regulatory or statutory provisions and the harm inflicted is not always considered part 
thereof.
618
 This implies that more often than not, the financial sanctions imposed on 
corporations may be disproportionate to the harm caused or vice versa. 
 
Alschuler submits that „the embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is that it 
punishes the innocent along with the guilty‟. 619  Wells submits that imposing 
punishment on corporations may result in „unfair or undesirable secondary harmful 
effects‟.620  The corporation as a fictitious entity does not bear the burden of the 
punishment; instead punishment is levied against the innocent such as employees and 
shareholders and may even affect creditors, consumers and the community within 
which the corporation operates.
621
 
  
Furthermore, the use of fines as the only penalty is problematic and as such there 
should be a variety of punishments available to the court with which to punish 
corporations.
622
 Moreover, imposing fines cannot be said to accurately reflect the 
severity of corporate crime as it has the potential to create the impression that 
corporate crime is tolerable provided that the corporate offender pays the fine.
623
  
 
Another challenge facing corporate criminal liability rests in the inefficacy of 
prosecuting corporate crime; despite the serious harm inflicted by corporations the 
number of prosecutions tends to be low.
624
 Farisani submits that the challenge 
pertaining to low prosecutions should be overcome, failing which, corporations may 
continue to commit crimes in the knowledge that it is improbable that they will be 
charged or punished.
625
 Corporate crime far outweighs the damage caused by street 
crime and the punishment imposed on corporations also differs drastically compared 
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to that of natural persons.
626
 Corporations may commit fraud, cause environmental 
harm and affect occupational health and safety issues of its employees. 
 
The author submits further that financial sanctions alone are not an effective deterrent 
against corporate crime nor can it be regarded as the only means with which to punish 
a corporation. This is especially so when considering the proliferation of corporations, 
the size of corporations and the far-reaching consequence that its activities may have 
on society, the economy and even the country. It may be argued that the imposition of 
financial penalties will have little deterrent effect on large corporations, as it tends to 
have deeper pockets as opposed to the individual. In the year 1987, BP was 
sanctioned to the payment of a fine in the sum of 750, 000 UK Sterling Pound, of 
which amounted to a mere 0.05 per cent of BP‟s after tax profits. 627  Moreover, 
financial sanctions ought to be large enough so as to send a message to the corporate 
offender, but it should not be punitive where it affects the salary of its employees.
628
   
 
However, the Law Reform Commission of New South Wales report629 provides that 
when sentencing a corporate offender, the court must consider the size of the 
corporation and its financial circumstances before passing sentence.
630
 The imposition 
of a substantial monetary fine may lead to the downfall of a smaller company as 
opposed to a larger company that may not even feel the pinch so to speak.
631
 South 
African courts share a similar sentiment to that of its Australian counterpart, for 
example the court in S v Shaik
632
 confirms that it is not feasible to impose any 
monetary sanction on a corporate body that cannot be recovered; for example the 
court should not impose a large financial sanction on a company if the amount cannot 
be paid in full.
633
 In this case, the financial sanction imposed was suspended provided 
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that the corporate accused was not found guilty of corruption, fraud or dishonesty 
during the period of suspension. 
 
4.5.1.1 Alternative forms of punishment for corporations 
 
The main objective of corporate punishment is to prevent and deter corporate 
offenders from re-offending and would be corporate offenders from offending. 
Clough and Mulhern have demonstrated that there are alternate forms of punishment 
available that does not include imposing financial sanctions on corporations and 
includes  
“publicity as a court – ordered sanction designed to have a punitive impact upon 
the corporation, corporate probation and in severe cases, the corporate 
equivalent of imprisonment could apply, for example restraint, immobilisation 
and an order the corporation cease trading in a limited sphere or be 
deregistered”.634  
 
Wells argues that the rationale behind enforcing non-financial sanctions is due to the 
diverse nature of corporate crimes.
635
  
 
Burchell refers to the use of criminal sanctions with which to punish corporations for 
negligence and asserts that this method of punishment is  
 
“further reinforced by the fact that COIDA636 and its predecessor637 preclude a 
common-law claim for damages by an employee against an employer where 
compensation under the legislation arises, without the need to prove fault on 
the part of the employer”.638  
 
FICA also provides for the punishment of corporations by imposing administrative 
sanctions that includes:  
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“caution, reprimand, remedial action, specific arrangements, restriction or 
suspension of certain specified business activities or financial penalty not 
exceeding R10 million in respect of natural persons and R50 million in respect 
of juristic persons”.639 
 
Burchell asserts that there appears to be no objection against a South African criminal 
court imposing any of the aforementioned sanctions on a corporate body, provided 
that the imposition thereof is not inconsistent with the Constitution.
640
   
 
Wells refers to alternate methods of punishment by imposing non-financial sanctions 
on a corporate offender and includes the incapacitation of a corporation such as 
corporate dissolution or corporate imprisonment in the form of probation, adverse 
publicity (name and shame), community service, direct compensation orders and 
punitive injunctions.
641
 The author submits that the legislature should provide 
alternate forms of punishments against corporations in addition to financial sanctions, 
such as probation and publicity orders that have the potential to be ruinous to the 
reputation and goodwill of a company. The author submits further that these 
combined penalties would be better suited at deterring would be corporate offenders 
as opposed to the imposition of financial sanctions only. Moreover, the criminal 
prosecution of and subsequent conviction of corporations has the power to punish and 
ruin the reputations of companies, which in turn will lead to corporate stigmatization 
and deterrent to would be corporate offenders. Wells submits that these approaches to 
punishment are promising as it acts not only as a deterrent but could also serve as 
retributive and rehabilitative measures against corporations.
642
  
 
Clough and Mulhern are of the opinion that deterrence and rehabilitation are the main 
objectives of punishing corporations.
643
 They argue that as corporations are fictitious 
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entities that are unable to feel shame, it cannot suffer from the punishment imposed 
and as such, the just deserts theory cannot apply to it.
644
  
 
Whether a corporate offender can be rehabilitated remains to be seen. Snyman is of 
the opinion that the rehabilitation of an offender is one sided as it only considers the 
circumstances of the accused as opposed to that of the victim. The Canadian Criminal 
Code
645
 makes provision for the reformation of a corporate offender who upon 
conviction may be forced to amend their future conduct by implementing changes to 
its internal structures, policies and procedures.
646
 
 
The U.S. Sentencing guidelines
647
 provides for alternatives to financial penalties and 
includes  
„orders of restitution, remedial order, community service‟ (which may be seen 
as a method of rehabilitating the corporate offender), „notice to the victims, 
publicity orders, probation as well as debarment and suspension and ordered 
corporations to publish letters of apology‟.648 
 
France provides for the dissolution of corporate entities including sanctions against 
partaking in professional or social activities and subjects corporations to judicial 
observation and prohibitions from the marketplace.
649
 
 
As stated previously, the imposition of financial sanctions or other penalties 
(administrative or civil) is that it has the potential to negatively affect shareholders 
and employees of the corporation.
650
 It should be noted that with every conviction of 
either a corporation or an individual, that such conviction has the potential to 
negatively affect innocent persons and/or shareholders.
651
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
It is clear that South Africa does take corporate criminal liability seriously. From the 
discussion it is evident that despite its fictitious nature, corporations are vested with 
juristic personality that are separate to the members that comprise it and is the bearer 
of rights and duties and as such, corporations just like individuals should also be held 
accountable and punished for its criminal actions. Furthermore, imposing financial 
sanctions against corporations are not deterrent enough nor can it be said to be 
retributive as it fails to effectively combat corporate crime.  
 
It is evident that the prevailing legislation is in need of reform and that the South 
African legislation needs to be amended to incorporate alternative measures with 
which to punish corporations by taking into account the methods of punishment and 
sentencing of international jurisdictions. Alternative methods of punishment may 
include non – financial sanctions such as; incapacitation of a corporation such as 
corporate dissolution or corporate imprisonment in the form of probation, adverse 
publicity (name and shame), community service, direct compensation orders and 
punitive injunctions.
652
 
 
The next chapter will provide recommendations to amend the current legislation by 
adopting an approach similar to the Australian criminal code by moving away from 
attribution as corporate criminal responsibility and rather to embrace the notion of 
corporate culture and true corporate fault as well as provide alternate methods with 
which to punish the corporate offender. The chapter will conclude with a summation 
of the chapters contained in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether it is indeed necessary to regulate 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa.
653
 Moreover, to establish whether the 
prevailing legislation effectively regulates and controls corporate criminal liability.
654
 
As illustrated herein, it is clear that the South African legislature understands the 
importance of regulating corporate criminal liability by holding corporate entities 
accountable for its transgressions against individuals and the community. The 
proliferation of corporations over the last few decades has also seen a significant 
increase in the harm associated with corporate negligence resulting in severe injury 
against individuals, employees and the environment and even death.
655
 The author 
submits that it is evident from the discussion contained herein, that it would be 
detrimental to the administration of justice to disregard the corporate criminal and that 
it is of great importance to regulate corporate criminal activity and to hold 
corporations responsible.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, corporate criminal liability in South Africa is 
regulated by section 332(1) of the CPA.
656
 Under section 332(1) of the CPA, a 
corporation may be held liable for the commission or omission all unlawful acts by a 
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director or servant and authorised third party including those acts committed outside 
the course and scope of employment provided that the offence was committed in the 
attempt of or to further the interests of the corporation.
657
 Section 332(1) of the CPA 
imputes the mens rea of the individual at fault as the mens rea of the corporation. 
Corporate criminal liability in South Africa is based on the principle of vicarious 
liability, which regulates the relationship between the director or servant and the 
corporation.
658
 Moreover, the liability of the corporation is dependent on the criminal 
acts of the director or servant or authorised third party.
659
 Section 332(1) of the CPA 
is akin to the principle of vicarious liability albeit a much wider interpretation thereof 
as it holds the corporate body liable for all offences
660
 including those that falls 
outside the scope of powers and duty as discussed in Chapters Two and Three, 
respectively.
661
 Farisani and Burchell asserts that corporate criminal liability under 
section 332 of the CPA is based on a derivative approach whereby the unlawful 
actions of the director or servant or authorised third person is attributed to the 
corporation and regarded as the acts of the corporate body, regardless of whether the 
offence committed went beyond the scope and powers of duty.
662
 Moreover, the 
                                                        
657
 Section 332 of the CPA. 
658
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 457-8. 
659
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 457-8. 
660
 See Chapter 1, pg 11 para 1 and includes liability for offences such as culpable homicide (R v 
Bennet & Co (Pty) Ltd (1941) TPD 194 and S v Joseph Mtshumayeli (Pvt) Ltd 1971 1 SA 33 (RA) ) 
theft (R v Markins Motors (1959) SA 508 (A)) fraud (R v Wege 1959 (3) SA 268 (C)) rape (K v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC)) and negligence (Ex parte Minister van Justisie: 
In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie 1992 (4) SA 804 (A)). See also Jordaan L (2003) 51. 
661
 See Chapter 2, pg 22 para 2 with reference to Section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977. ABSA Bank Ltd v Born Equipment (Pretoria) (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 372 (SCA) 378, Nana CN 
(2011) 93-94. See also pg 23 para 2 with reference to K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 
419 (CC) and Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733 and Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 
(A) at para 134C-E the court held “It seems clear that an act done by a servant solemnly for his own 
interest and purposes, although occasioned by his employment, may fall outside the course or scope of 
his employment. This is a subjective test. On the other hand if there is a close link between the 
employees act and his personal interests but for the business of his employer, the employer would be 
liable. This is the objective test. In conflating the two tests to the facts, he found the employer liable. 
Moreover, “... a master...is liable even for acts which he has not authorized provided that they are so 
connected with acts which he has authorized that they may rightly be regarded as modes – although 
improper modes – of doing them”. F v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 1 SA 606 (WCC).  
662
 Nana asserts that section 332(1) of the CPA is much wider than the traditional concept of vicarious 
liability as the section extends beyond the ultra vires doctrine whereby a corporation may be held 
criminally liable for all criminal acts provided that the act was committed in furtherance of or 
endeavouring to further the interests of the corporation, see Nana CN (2011) 93-4, see NK v Minister of 
Safety and Security (2005) (3) 179 (SCA), where the Minister was held liable for the criminal acts of a 
police officer despite the fact that the act had amounted to a deviation from his ordinary course of 
employment. R v Phillips Dairy (Pty) Ltd 1955 (4) SA 120 (T). Burchell J (2013) 439 and 450-1. 
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corporation is held criminally liable despite the absence of fault and a blameworthy 
state of mind.
663
 
 
The issue to be determined is whether section 332 of the CPA is an adequate and 
effective mechanism with which to curb and combat corporate crime. Borg-Jorgensen, 
Van der Linde and Jordaan submit that application of section 332(1) of the CPA is 
harsh and possibly unconstitutional in that it fails to recognise the rights afforded to 
juristic persons as set out in the Bill of Rights.
664
 Moreover, corporate criminal 
liability is only possible in terms of the principle of attribution, whereby the fault of a 
director or servant or authorised third party is imputed to the corporation as its own, 
failure to prove individual fault will result in the corporation escaping prosecution and 
punishment.
665
 Individual fault presupposes corporate criminal liability.
666
 
 
The author submits that corporate criminal liability in South Africa should move 
away from the vicarious liability approach and instead adopt an organisational or 
collective approach with which to determine corporate liability. What follows are 
recommendations to amend the current legislation by adopting an approach similar to 
the Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995
667
 (Act 1995) by moving away from the 
attribution of individual fault of corporate criminal responsibility and instead embrace 
the notion of corporate culture and true corporate fault.  
  
                                                        
663
 Jordaan L (2003) 50 and Snyman CR (2002) 249. 
664
 Juristic persons are entrenched with the same rights as natural persons and these include the right to 
not be deprived of their freedom and security; and of presumption of innocence as set out in sections 12 
and 35(3) and (h) of the 1996 Constitution. See also Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 
457, Jordaan L (2013) 68-9. 
665
 Section 332(1)(a) of the CPA, see Burchell J (2013) 454 and Snyman CR (2002) 249, the principle 
of attribution is where the acts or omissions of a director or servant is imputed to the corporate body 
and these acts are regarded as the acts of the corporate body. 
666
 S v Dersley 1997 2 SA 951 (T), Farisani D (2009) 217. See also Burchell J (2013) 454-5. 
667
 Commonwealth of Australia, Criminal Code Act 12 of 1995 (1995 Australian Acts 12) (hereinafter 
Act 1995). 
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5.2 The way forward 
 
The Constitutional Court has not yet assessed the constitutionality of section 332 of 
the CPA in its entirety.
668
 Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde, Jordaan and Farisani, 
agree that the applicability of section 332 of the CPA when challenged, may in its 
entirety be declared unconstitutional and inconsistent with the values and principles 
embodied in the Bill of Rights. 
 
Farisani asserts that  
 
“corporate criminal liability in South Africa is so defective, inadequate and so 
unjust that neither amendments to section 332 of the CPA nor severance of 
parts of the provision will lead to corporations being held criminally liable in 
an effective, adequate and just manner. Amendment or severance will not 
cater for all the aspects that need to be addressed in the process of reform. It is 
submitted that the problems raised by section 332 of the CPA may be resolved 
through the formulation of a new legal framework for corporate criminal 
liability in South Africa.” 669 
 
It is on this premise that the author suggests that the existing legislation is in need of 
reformation and proposes that it be supplemented to reflect an approach similar to the 
organisational model whereby corporate criminal liability is determined in accordance 
with corporate fault that is independent from the unlawful conduct of an individual.
670
  
 
This view is echoed by Nana who also suggests that South Africa should adopt „an 
approach similar to the “corporate culture” model applied in Australia. 671  Borg-
                                                        
668
 S v Coetzee & Others (1997) – the Constitutional Court dealt with the constitutionality of section 
332(5) of the CPA which created a reverse onus whereby an accused was presumed guilty of the 
commission of a crime and the onus rested on such accused to prove otherwise. The court held that 
section 332(5) of the CPA infringes upon a person‟s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty by court of a law and that such infringement could not be justified in terms of the 
limitations clause as stated in sections 35(3)(h) and 36 of the 1996 Constitution, respectively. 
669
 Farisani D A Comparative Study of Corporate Criminal Liability – Advancing an Argument for the 
Reform of Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa, by introducing a new offence of Corporat 
Homicide (unpublished LLD thesis, University of Kaw-Zulu Natal, Pietermarisburg Campus, 2014) 
424. 
670
 See Chapter 2. See also Jordaan L (2013) 49 in Burchell J (2013) 451. 
671
 Nana CN (2011) 103. 
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Jorgensen and Van der Linde agree that the organisational approach is the best way 
forward with which to determine corporate criminal liability
672
 as it ensures that all 
offences are treated the same by not differentiating certain offences from others.
673
 
 
Under section 332(1) of the CPA, a corporation may be held vicariously liable for the 
commission of a crime despite the existence of policies and procedures and it is 
unable to raise a defence of due diligence despite having exercised due diligence and 
taken reasonable care to prevent the commission of the crime.
674
 Moreover, the 
corporation can be held vicariously liable for the unlawful acts of an individual, 
despite the absence of fault and a blameworthy state of mind.
675
 This was illustrated 
in S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie
676
 where the defendant was convicted 
despite having shown that it had exercised the requisite due diligence and care.
677
 
Furthermore, section 332(1) of the CPA creates corporate liability despite the absence 
of corporate fault.
678
  
 
Corporate criminal liability under the existing legislation (section 332(1) of the CPA) 
imputes the mens rea of the individual to the corporation as its own, which as stated 
above, implies that there can be no corporate liability without proof of individual fault 
resulting in the corporate body escaping liability.
679
 In terms of the organisational 
model, the fault element is found in the culture of the corporation as opposed to the 
individual;
680
 however it is required that the actus reus of an offence must be carried 
out by an employee, agent or officer of a corporation who is acting within the 
confines of his or her duty.
681
  
 
However, Act 1995 provides a defence of due diligence to the corporate offender for 
the conduct of its high managerial agents of due diligence if the corporate body is able 
                                                        
672
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K „Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: time for a 
change? (part 2) TSAR (2011) 4 700. 
673
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 700. 
674
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 458. 
675
 See fn 137, Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 458. 
676
 S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie 1991 (2) SA 698 (W). 
677
 Jordaan L (2013) 53. 
678
 Section 332(1) of the CPA  
679
 Section 332(1)(a) of the CPA, see Burchell J (2013) 454 and Snyman CR (2002) 249, the principle 
of attribution is where the acts or omissions of a director or servant is imputed to the corporate body 
and these acts are regarded as the acts of the corporate body. 
680
 Section 12.3(1) of Act 1995. 
681
 Jordaan L (2013) 64, Section 12.2 of Act 1995. 
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to prove that it had exercised due diligence and taken reasonable steps prevent the 
occurrence, authorisation or permission of the crime.
682
 Pollack correctly submits that 
by offering due diligence as a defence, it should not preclude criminal prosecutions as 
a corporate body may deviate from its policies and procedures and in this instance, 
should be held liable for any such deviation.
683
 The author submits that the existences 
of policies and procedures or not in a corporation should have no bearing in 
determining the criminal liability of a corporation and instead should be used to 
determine the collective intention
684
 and negligence of the corporate body.
685
 
 
In light of the above mentioned, the author submits that section 332(1) of the CPA is 
deeply flawed. It is on this summation that the author proposes that the current 
legislation be replaced with the organisational model under the premise of Act 1995. 
Corporate criminal liability under the proposed model will no longer be dependent on 
proof of individual fault
686
 nor can it be used as an alternative to individual 
liability.
687
 Moreover, application and enforcement of the proposed model intends to  
remedy this issue by implementing direct corporate liability through the creation of 
policies and procedures based on the organisational model, whereby fault is attributed 
to the corporation through the internal decision-making structures and policies as 
opposed to individual fault.
688
  
 
The proposed legal framework should replace the existing legislation with the 
corporate culture model, which may be defined as  
 
“an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the 
body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate where the 
offence occurred”.689 
 
                                                        
682
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 697, Section 12.3(3) of Act 1995. Unlike section 
332(1) of the CPA 1997, where no defence of due diligence was made available to the corporate 
offender even if it were able to prove the existence of its policies and procedures. 
683
 Pollack BJ „Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability‟ 
Am Crim LR (2009) 1393 in Burchell J (2013) 455. 
684
 Pollack BJ (2009) 1393 in Burchell J (2013) 455. 
685
 Burchell J (2013) 455. 
686
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 700. 
687
 Jordaan L (2013) 71. 
688
 Wells C „ (2005) 153-4. 
689
 Wells C (2005) 153. 
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Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde avers that the enactment of new legislation in the 
corporate sector appears to support the idea of adopting an organisational approach to 
corporate criminal liability.
690
 The new Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for the 
implementation of social and ethics committees of certain companies to ensure good 
governance and compliance with public safety issues and the prevention of 
corruption.
691
  
The author submits that South African corporate law appears to be on trend as is 
evident in the King Code of Corporate Governance Principles (King IV),
692
 which 
contains principles and guidelines for the implementation of policies and procedures 
that ensures corporate responsibility and encapsulates the principles enshrined in the 
Constitution. King IV is founded on the concept of good corporate citizenship, which 
may be  
“defined as the exercise of ethical and effective leadership by the governing 
body towards the achievement of ethical culture, good performance, effective 
control and legitimacy”.693  
King IV provides that the „governing body‟s primary governance role and 
responsibilities‟ includes the promoting of ethical leadership and corporate citizenship. 
Moreover, management or the board of directors should alone be responsible for the 
strategic direction and control of the corporation, construct the company‟s policies 
and procedures by establishing a code of conduct to which the company must 
conform and ensure compliance with the applicable laws.
694
 The board is tasked with 
the responsibility to create an ethical corporate culture by formulating an ethics 
committee that is established with the sole purpose of monitoring the ethics of the 
corporation through assessment, reporting and disclosure.
695
  
 
                                                        
690
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 701. 
691
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 701, reg 42 Companies Act 71 of 2008 
692
 The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa King Code of Corporate Governance Principles for 
South Africa 2016 (hereinafter King IV) available at https://www.adamsadams.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/King-IV-Report.pdf accessed on 15 November 2018). 
693
 King IV 20. 
694
 King IV 21. 
695
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The principles as set out in King IV acts as a guideline and are applicable to all 
organisations. However, application of King IV is voluntary unless prescribed by law 
or a stock exchange Listings Requirement and as such, application thereof cannot be 
enforced on a corporation with the exception of listed companies.
696
 
 
Nana suggests that corporate criminal liability under the organisational model is only 
possible if it can be shown that the board of directors who created the corporate 
culture of the corporation tolerated the conduct that resulted in commission of the 
crime.
697
 Moreover, as set out in King IV, the directors are responsible for creating 
corporate culture and senior management are responsible for implementing the 
policies and procedures. 
 
The author submits that the proposed legal framework should be based on Act 1995 
and should include the following: 
 
The Act shall make provision whereby it  
“recognises true corporate fault as the basis for criminal liability for offences 
requiring negligence as well as offences requiring subjective fault.” 698 
 
A corporation shall be guilty for an offence of intention, knowledge or recklessness 
whereby fault is attributed to the corporate body that expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.
699
 A corporation shall be 
deemed to have authorised the commission of an offence if it can be proved that the 
conduct was directed or tolerated by the board of directors
700
 or whether the conduct 
was directed or tolerated by a high managerial agent.
701
. 
 
                                                        
696
 King IV™ Summary Guide available at 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/za/pdf/2016/11/King-IV-Summary-Guide.pdf (accessed on 
22 November 2018). 
697
 Nana CN (2011) 103. 
698
 Jordaan L (2013) 63, section 12.3(1) of Act 1995. 
699
 Section 12.3(1) of Act 1995.  
700
 Section 12.3(2)(a) of Act 1995. 
701
 Section 12.3(2)(b) of Act 1995. Under Act 1995, corporate criminal liability may be established 
without the requisite proof of attributing individual liability to the corporate body (section 332(1) of the 
CPA 1997). 
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It is the duty of the state to establish and prove that all of the elements of the offence 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt including the existence of organisational fault.
702
 The 
fault and conduct of high-ranking officials may provide proof of the existence of 
organisational fault.
703
   
 
The onus rests on the state to prove that “corporate culture existed within the 
corporate body that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the 
relevant provision.
704
 A court may convict a corporation for an offence by proving 
that the corporate body failed to establish and maintain a corporate culture that 
ensures compliance with the statutory provisions.
705
  
 
Moreover, the Act shall impose a sentencing regime that will act as both retributive 
and deter would be corporate offenders
706
 from engaging in criminal behaviour by 
implementing provisions that ensures effective compliance of the company‟s policies 
and procedures as provided in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines of the United 
States.
707
 The U.S. Sentencing guidelines
708
 provides for alternatives to financial 
penalties that includes orders of restitution, remedial order, community service‟ 
(which may be seen as a method of rehabilitating the corporate offender), „notice to 
the victims, publicity orders, probation as well as debarment and suspension and 
ordered corporations to publish letters of apology‟.709 
 
The Act shall further make provision for the imposition of financial and non – 
financial sanctions as punishment on corporate entities. Non – financial sanctions may 
include administrative penalties;
710
 criminal sanctions;
711
 the incapacitation of a 
corporation such as corporate dissolution or corporate imprisonment in the form of 
                                                        
702
 Section 12.3(1) of Act 1995. 
703
 Jordaan L (2013) 71. 
704
 Section 12.3(2)(c) of Act 1995. 
705
 Section 12.3(2)(d) of Act 1995. 
706
 Jordaan L (2013) 71. 
707
 Borg-Jorgensen VL & Van der Linde K (2011) 701. 
708
 United States Sentencing Commission Federal Sentences Guidelines Manual (2011) available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_guidelines/index (accessed on 20 May 2017). 
709
 Diamantis M (2016) 2065. 
710
 Administrative penalties may include caution, reprimand, remedial action, specific arrangements, 
restriction or suspension of certain specified business activities, see section 45 of Financial and 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
711
 Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA) 
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probation, adverse publicity (name and shame), community service, direct 
compensation orders and punitive injunctions.
712
 
 
In Chapter one, the author posed the question whether there is a need to regulate 
corporate criminal liability and whether the provisions of section 332(1) of the CPA 
effectively regulate it. The author provided a detailed discussion on the different 
models of corporate criminal liability by evulating which of the four models would 
best suit the South African approach to corporate criminal liability, these include; 
vicarious liability, the identification doctrine, the aggregrate model and the 
organisational model.
713
 The author showed that the South African model is based on 
the derivative model of vicarious liability which through it‟s interpretation and 
application poses numerous issues, including the constitutionality pertaining to the 
rights of juristic persons (corporae entities), for example, sections 35(3) and h) of the 
Constitution, 1996. Moreover, the author showed that there is a need to regulate 
corporate criminal liability and the most appropriate model is the organisational 
model. The author provided a discussion on effective punishments against corporate 
entities and submitted that financial sanctions are not deterrent enough, especially 
against larger corporations.
714
 The author provided alternate sanctions and or 
punishments for corporations.
715
 The author concludes that the South African model 
for corporate criminal liability is in need of change and that the organisational model 
is the most suited for the reasons expressed herein and that alternate methods of 
punishment are needed are available, the legislature should enact it to ensure that 
corporations are properly charged and prosecuted and adequately punished for its 
transgressions.  
                                                        
712
 Wells C (2001) 37. 
713
 See Chapter 2. 
714
 Chapter 4, see also Wells C (2001) 33. 
715
 These include the incapacitation of a corporation such as corporate dissolution or corporate 
imprisonment in the form of probation, adverse publicity (name and shame), community service, direct 
compensation orders and punitive injunctions, see Wells C (2001) 37. Alternate sanctions includes 
criminal sanctions see Burchell J (2013) 457.  
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5.3 Conclusion 
 
From the discussion set out in this paper, it is evident that the failure to regulate the 
activities of corporate bodies may have resulted in the likelihood of corporations 
escaping liability for its criminal actions and the considerable harm that it causes.
716
 
Corporate criminal liability is essential and an absolute necessity as it regulates the 
unlawful acts of the directors, servants and authorised third parties of a corporate 
body by ensuring that corporations are held accountable and are punished 
accordingly.
717
  
 
Corporations are vested with legal personality that equates to a distinct and separate 
persona to that of the individuals that comprise it and such, the corporate body can 
only act and think through its agents which establishes individual liability and makes 
corporate liability possible under section 332(1) of the CPA.
718
  Corporations are the 
bearer of rights and duties that are not shared with natural persons. This is in line with 
Bucy‟s philosophy that a corporation has an identifiable persona and „ethos‟ separate 
to those who comprise it.
719
 The author submits that Bucy‟s philosophy in essence 
establishes an organisational mode of thinking and paving the way for direct 
corporate fault. 
 
It is clear that South Africa has due regard for the seriousness of corporate crime and 
has taken steps to regulate it, however, the author submits that the law has failed to 
progress, especially considering the advances in corporate criminal law in countries 
such as the U.K. and Australia and Canada.
720
 Moreover, the existing legislation in 
comparison to other jurisdictions may prove to be ineffective and inadequate in 
regulating corporate criminal liability.
721
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It has been suggested that section 332(1) of the CPA may be declared unconstitutional 
in its entirety if challenged by a court of law.
722
 Moreover, the application of the no-
fault liability of corporations under section 332(1) of the CPA is open ended and may 
give rise to constitutional challenges in terms of sections 8(4) and 35 of the 
Constitution in the future.
723
 Whether a juristic person can rely on the presumption of 
innocence does not seem probable especially as it lacks a physical existence and 
moral disposition and as such, the author agrees with Jordaan‟s contention that the 
right to be presumed innocent should benefit natural persons only.
724
 
 
Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde suggests that the issues pertaining to the 
constitutionality of section 332 may be resolved if the legislature were to replace the 
existing section 322 with the organisational model that recognises true corporate 
fault.
725
 For this reason, it is important to look beyond the current models of corporate 
criminal liability that rely heavily on the identification doctrine or the vicarious 
approach.
726
 Instead the focus should shift towards an organisational model that 
incorporates corporate fault that may be deduced or evidenced from the company‟s 
behaviour when it is assessed based in accordance with its corporate policy and 
procedures.
727
  
 
The author submits that the most effective way to curb and combat corporate crime 
will be to punish corporations directly as opposed to individuals. The legislature 
should consider the very real possibility that financial sanctions are neither retributive 
nor effective enough and seek to provide new and diverse forms of punishment. 
Especially in larger companies with a much higher turnover that might not „feel‟ the 
pinch when paying a fine and/or compensation in terms of a civil claim and should 
recognise that it is not the only solution to curb corporate criminality. Moreover, 
criminal prosecutions of corporations should not supersede individual liability.
728
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Furthermore, a court when determining which sentence is most appropriate for the 
corporate offender should look at the three guiding principles as set out in S v Zinn
729
 
that considers the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of the offender and the 
public offender. These principles are collectively known as the triad of Zinn. 
 
Instead, the legislature should look to international statutes such as the United 
Kingdom Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act of 2007, which 
provides for publicity and remedial orders and fines as potential redress
730
 and 
implement various forms of punishment including probation and restraint, 
immobilisation and cease of operation orders and asset forfeitures in respect of 
serious crimes (culpable homicide) and habitual offenders
731
 as section 332(1) of the 
CPA is wide enough to impute culpable homicide to corporations.
732
  
 
When a company is convicted of a criminal offence in the UK, a court can impose a 
fine and/or an order that disqualifies a corporation from competing for public sector 
contracts (tenders) or close the company down by means of liquidation, which of 
course can cause collateral damage to innocent employees and shareholders.
733
 The 
author submits that this should be the preferred punishment for corporations found 
guilty of criminal offences as it may well prove to be a more effective and adequate 
means with which to curb and combat corporate crime as it evokes a sense of 
retribution for the victims of corporate crime and may serve as a more effective 
deterrent against would be corporate offenders. 
The author submits that the existing legislation should be supplemented with the 
organisational model for the reasons explained in this paper and further that the 
proposed model embodies the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights as it may 
preserve the rights afforded to juristic persons and eliminate the over-broadness of 
section 332(1).
734
 The inclusion of this model creates and establishes corporate 
criminal liability without the requisite proof of attributing individual liability to the 
corporation. This model places the onus on the state to prove the guilt of an accused 
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beyond a reasonable doubt on as opposed to an accused bearing the onus, which 
preserves an accused‟s right to be presumed innocent and to receive a fair trial.735  
                                                        
735
 Section 35(3)(h) of the Constitution 1996. 
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